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Many civil rights scholars despair that the Equal Protection 
Clause’s success in securing women and minorities’ formal 
equality has come at the price of achieving substantive equality 
for individuals without regard to their race or sex.4 In the service 
 
 1. Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University 
School of Law. 
 2. Professor of Law, Hofstra University.  
 3. Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  
 4. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal 
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1080 (2001) (arguing that 
“[r]acial inequality is integral rather than peripheral to basic social processes, woven into 
our cultural fabric rather than placed on top of it,” but “equal protection doctrine, 
however formulated” is unable “to transcend or overcome that inequality”); Guy-Uriel 
E. Charles, Toward A New Civil Rights Framework, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 353, 353 
(2007) (arguing that “the civil rights movement is dead and . . . a racial malaise has set in” 
because “we have reached a point of equilibrium that is destined to rigorously enforce 
formal equality but never reach actual racial parity”); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination 
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1347 (1988) (writing that “the very terms used to proclaim 
victory [in the civil rights movement] contain within them the seeds of defeat” and 
“[e]qual opportunity law may have also undermined the fragile consensus against white 
supremacy”); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness 
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 954 (1993) (arguing 
that “the pursuit of colorblindness progressively reveals itself to be an inadequate social 
policy if the ultimate goal is substantive racial justice” and noting that “[b]lacks continue 
to inhabit a very different America than do whites”); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme 
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1978) (castigating equal protection 
doctrine because “for as surely as the law has outlawed racial discrimination, it has 
affirmed that Black Americans can be without jobs, have their children in all-black, 
poorly funded schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have very little 
political power, without any violation of antidiscrimination law”); Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 487–88 (2004) (arguing that “the suspect 
classification label has made it more, rather than less, difficult for government to remedy 
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of “formal equality,” for example, the Court has barred race-
conscious measures to remedy past societal discrimination5 or to 
achieve integration.6 Intentional discrimination alone violates 
the principle of formal equality—policies or practices with 
substantial disparate impact on the basis of race, sex, or national 
origin do not. Indeed, the principle of formal equality can 
prevent government officials from discarding ability tests 
because they have a disparate impact on the basis of race.7 
 
the effects of hostility toward racial minorities in employment, voting, and other arenas” 
and acts “as a barrier to programs designed to redress race discrimination”); Neil 
Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of colorblindness or formal equality fosters “white 
racial domination”); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 
375 (2007) (explaining that “[s]ince the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis, 
the limits of the intent standard in remedying persistent racial inequities have been a 
leading preoccupation” among civil rights scholars); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 
387 (1987) (discussing how “[t]he intent requirement is a centerpiece in an ideology of 
equal opportunity that legitimizes the continued existence of racially and economically 
discriminatory conditions and rationalizes the superordinate status of privileged whites”); 
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1143 (1997) (explaining that “today 
doctrines of heightened scrutiny function primarily to constrain legislatures from 
adopting policies designed to reduce race and gender stratification, while doctrines of 
discriminatory purpose offer only weak constraints on the forms of facially neutral state 
action that continue to perpetuate the racial and gender stratification of American 
society”); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 935, 955–56 (1989) (arguing that the Court’s adoption of the discriminatory 
intent standard in Washington v. Davis signaled “a withdrawal from the front lines of 
social change” and entails “a degree of infidelity” to the 14th Amendment’s purpose of 
ending the second-class citizenship of African Americans); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–24 (1980) (arguing that the equal protection doctrine offers little 
assistance to African Americans hoping for an end to racial subordination because the 
“interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it 
converges with the interests of whites . . . [, and] the fourteenth amendment, standing 
alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks”). 
 5. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (striking city’s 
policy of requiring city contractors to award a proportion of subcontracts to minority 
owned businesses because the city had not demonstrated that the paucity of minority 
owned contractors was created by any “identified” acts of “discrimination”).  
 6. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725, 
747–48 (2007) (finding that school district’s use of race to reduce racial concentration in 
schools and ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns did not prevent nonwhite 
students from attending district’s most desirable schools violated the 14th Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 7. The reasoning is that officials intentionally base their decisions to discard such 
tests on race because such tests fail to produce sufficient numbers of racial minority 
groups eligible for a position or for a promotion. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 
(2009) (finding “the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the 
statistical disparity based on race—[that is,] . . . how minority candidates had performed 
when compared to white candidates. . . . [and] [w]ithout some other justification, this 
express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VII’s command that employers cannot 
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Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause 
regulates just state action, not private actors, leaving many 
things that contribute to women’s inequality outside the reach of 
the Constitution and Congress to remedy. 
In the 1970s, Kenneth Karst foresaw equality’s limitations. 
“[T]he formal guarantee of equal civil rights, necessary as it was 
to achieving the full inclusion of all Americans in the national 
community, [will] take us only partway toward” full inclusion.8 
He urged courts and civil rights lawyers to think in terms of 
guaranteeing equal citizenship status for all Americans. The 
principle of equal citizenship requires that “[e]ach individual is 
presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a 
respected, responsible, and participating member.”9 
As this definition implies, citizenship encompasses more 
than formal membership in a society. According to Karst, 
“citizenship . . . begins [with] the formal recognition of” equality, 
but it “is also a principle of substance.”10 As surely as formal 
barriers deny equal citizenship to individuals, so too do 
“substantive inequalities,” which “effectively bar people from 
full membership.”11 The state is not the only culprit in creating 
castes of citizens—nongovernmental institutions have played 
(and continue to play) a significant role in “segregating 
American public life,” and excluding members of some groups 
from full inclusion in that public life.12 
More recently, Reva Siegel has argued that the Nineteenth 
Amendment might be a more powerful weapon than the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause for securing 
substantive equality for women. She has documented that the 
Nineteenth Amendment’s purpose was to guarantee women’s 
equal status as citizens. It disrupted two powerful barriers to that 
equal status that persisted under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
First, the public/private distinction insulated most acts by private 
citizens from Fourteenth Amendment liability and many from 
federal regulation.13 Second, federalism prohibited Congress 
from regulating marital and familial relationships. 
 
take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race”).  
 8. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 5 (1989).  
 9. Id. at 3. 
 10. Id. at 9. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 12.  
 13. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); see also (pp. 25–26) 
(Rogers M. Smith essay); (p. 383) (Elizabeth M. Schneider essay).  
!!!MCGOWAN-281-STOPFIGHTFORWOMEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2012 12:59 PM 
142 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:139 
 
Professors Karst and Siegel (and others) believe that 
reframing issues of women’s equality as issues of women’s 
inferior status as citizens could avoid some of the conceptual and 
constitutional hurdles that have blocked progress toward 
substantive sex equality. Specifically, women could argue, first, 
that private persons, not just state actors, undermine their 
citizenship status; second, that policies with disparate impact are 
just as pernicious as disparate treatment; and, third, that 
individuals have the right to demand certain positive 
entitlements in addition to negative liberties to secure their 
equal status as citizens. 
In Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Citizenship, 
twenty prominent feminist scholars explore what equal 
citizenship for women would mean, what elements such a 
concept would contain, and whether it could successfully further 
the quest for substantive equality. The editors of this volume of 
essays—Professors Linda McClain and Joanna Grossman—
argue that a troubling gap persists between the discourse or 
“formal commitments” to women’s equality and the persisting 
material inequalities of women’s lives (p. 1). Equality suffers 
from a number of drawbacks. First, women’s claims for equality 
often get hung up on beliefs that women are different from men 
in ways that are relevant to their attaining equal pay, equal 
participation in all types of work, and equal representation in 
leadership positions in business and politics.14 Whatever the 
cause, women still shoulder the lion’s share of caretaking 
responsibility for children and home. They also dominate pink-
collar service jobs, while performing only a small proportion of 
science and technology jobs. If women are different than men, 
equality will not take women very far. 
Second, equality can only be assessed according to some 
baseline. For women, that benchmark is male. Feminists resist 
using men as a benchmark for many reasons. Difference 
feminists do so because they believe that women are different 
from men and that some of women’s traits are better. Some 
disparage the goal of being like men as impossible or 
unpalatable—Joan Williams has argued that men’s superior 
economic status has depended on women’s contributions to 
home and children.15 Those contributions have made it possible 
 
 14. For most purposes it does not matter whether these differences are biological or 
constructed so long as they exist.  
 15. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 3, 5 (2000). 
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for most men to be “ideal workers”—workers who can put work 
before home and family, secure in the knowledge that their 
partners will manage the house, children, their social life, and 
emergencies. Ideal workers often miss out on the joys of home 
and family life.16 
But when a woman shoulders the role of “the ideal worker,” 
she will sacrifice things that most men will not. According to 
2010 Census data, high-earning women are about as twice as 
likely as high-earning men never to have married.17 Such a 
woman is also more than twice as likely to be divorced or 
separated than a similar man.18 If she is married and has children, 
she probably cannot leave the children home with dad while she 
returns to work.19 Instead, a high-earning mother will outsource 
the care and love of her children to paid help or extended family 
members—and she will have to cope with the accompanying 
guilt of having done so. Most women find the costs of being an 
ideal worker too high.20 Consequently, many women put lofty 
career goals on hold for at least a while. But this choice also 
 
 16. Id. at 4.  
 17. The exact statistic is that in 2010, 15.2% of women and 9.4% of men (over the 
age of 15) who earned $100,000 or more have never married. U.S. Census Bureau, 
Marital Status of People 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Personal Earnings, Race, and 
Hispanic Origin, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2010, tbl.A1, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.html (last visited Oct. 
6, 2011). That gap has narrowed since 2006, when 17% of women and 8.3% of men over 
the age of 15 who earned $100,000 had never married. U.S. Census Bureau, Marital 
Status of People 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Personal Earnings, Race, and Hispanic 
Origin, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2006, tbl.A1, http://www. 
census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006.html (last visited, Oct. 6, 2011).  
 18. The exact figures are 13.5% of women earning $100,000 or more are divorced, 
while 6% of such men are. See U.S. Census Bureau, Marital Status of People 15 Years and 
Over: 2010, supra note 17, at tbl.A1. 
 19. In 2010, there were about 154,000 stay-at-home dads, according to U.S. Census 
data; in comparison, there were about 5,020,000 stay-at home moms. In other words, moms 
comprise about 97% of parents staying at home with children. Among families with 
earnings over $100,000, the proportion of moms to dads in the stay at home parent pop-
ulation remains about the same—about 97% are women and 3% are men. U.S. Census 
Bureau, Married Couple Family Groups With Children Under 15 by Stay-At-Home Status 
of Both Spouses, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2010, tbl.FG8, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.html (last visited Oct. 
6, 2011). But, between 2006 and 2010, the number of stay at home dads doubled in those 
high earning families. In 2006, there were only 18,000 men in such families staying at 
home with children, while 1,234,000 women stayed at home (that is, 98.6% of parents staying 
home were moms). U.S. Census Bureau, Married Couple Family Groups With Children 
Under 15 by Stay-At-Home Status of Both Spouses, and Race and Hispanic Origin of the 
Reference Person, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2006, tbl.FG8, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006.html (last visited, Oct. 
6, 2011).  
 20. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 38.  
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costs dearly. Women who interrupt their careers for even a year 
to stay home with young children suffer a permanent pay cut of 
about 11%, while those who take off three years will take a 
permanent pay cut of nearly 40%.21 
Third, the United States Constitution limits equality’s utility 
in several different ways. Fourteenth Amendment rights shield 
individuals from government action, not from private action.22 
Indeed, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have read the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement to restrict 
Congress’s power to punish private conduct that makes it harder 
for others to exercise their civil rights.23 Also, the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits only state action that intentionally 
discriminates against women. The Court defines intentional 
discrimination narrowly—an action undertaken because of its 
discriminatory effect on women.24 Even when if it is obvious that 
some policy will disadvantage women, a legislature may enact 
the measure unless the legislature’s very purpose was to 
disadvantage women.25 
Finally, women cannot brandish the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to demand government benefits. Most formal barriers to 
women’s equality fell decades ago. The main impediments 
today—persisting job segregation, the lack of paid parental leave 
(and the fathers’ tendency to take less, if any, of it), affordable, 
 
 21. Miranda O. McGowan, Engendered Differences 28 (Mar. 17, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (citing Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck Luce, Off-Ramps 
and On-Ramps: Keeping Talented Women on the Road to Success, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Mar. 2005, at 43, 46), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1361196).  
 22. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000). Some Supreme Court 
decisions support reading the 14th Amendment to extend to some private actions. For 
example, United States v. Guest upheld a criminal indictment of two private individuals 
for violating 18 U.S.C. § 241, which prohibited conspiracies between “two or more 
persons . . . to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or 
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States . . . .” 383 U.S. 745, 747 (1966) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964)). The 
Supreme Court held that the indictment pled sufficient “state action” when “[o]ne of the 
means of accomplishing the object of the conspiracy, according to the indictment, was 
‘By causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had 
committed criminal acts.’” Id. at 756.  
 23. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621. 
 24. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276 (1979).  
 25. The Supreme Court’s decisions in both Morrison and Ricci v. DeStefano have 
cast doubt on Congress’s powers to address either race- or sex-based disparate impact. 
Ricci held that a city violated Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1), 
when it threw out the results of an employee-promotion test because it had a disparate 
impact based on race. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673–74 (2009). The city’s decision, the Court 
reasoned, was because of race, and therefore was intentional discrimination in violation 
of Title VII. Id. at 2674.  
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high quality childcare, and reasonable accommodations for 
pregnancy—will only fall if government takes affirmative steps 
and private individuals make different choices. 
In short, formal, legal equality is necessary but not sufficient 
to attain substantive equality (p. 2).26 Substantive equality 
requires dismantling major structural impediments to women’s 
full participation in all spheres of civic life. Harrison Bergeron, 
Kurt Vonnegut’s dystopic story of equality run amok, is a good 
example.27 Vonnegut satirizes a society that elevates equality of 
outcomes above all other values. Heavy weights encumber 
ballerinas’ legs, beautiful people wear hideous masks, headsets 
blurt nonsense into the ears of intelligent people, and heavy 
chains shackle the strong. The deadlock between formal equality 
and substantive equality has many thinking that those looking to 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause for help 
should look elsewhere. Is “citizenship” the right place to look? 
Having full status as a citizen entitles a person to equal 
status as other citizens and full inclusion into society. The 
authors of these essays suggest that women’s rights proponents 
should consider insisting on women’s rights to be full-fledged 
citizens of their countries and the world community, rather than 
pushing for women’s “equality.”28 They offer several reasons 
why citizenship might be a more fruitful frame for demanding 
substantive equality for women. In particular, some of the essays 
in this volume argue that citizenship gives women grounds to 
argue that laws with disparate impact undermine women’s 
citizenship as surely as laws that facially discriminate; that 
private acts of discrimination as well as discriminatory state 
action impinge on women’s citizenship; and that citizenship gives 
women grounds to demand positive entitlements as well as 
freedom from government restraints. This review surveys these 
arguments and then discusses the limitations of staking women’s 
claims to equal status on citizenship. The concept of citizenship 
may reflect gender stereotypes to such a degree that it could 
cause as much mischief as it avoids. Citizenship rights may also 
 
 26. See also (p. 255) (Martha Albertson Fineman essay) (“[F]ormal equality is 
inevitably uneven equality because existing inequalities abound throughout society, and 
a concept of equality that is merely formal in nature cannot adequately address them.”).  
 27. See generally Kurt Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE 
MONKEY HOUSE 7 (2010). 
 28. Not all of the contributors to this volume agree. See, e.g., (p. 252) (Martha 
Albertson Fineman essay) (questioning whether the concept of “equal citizenship” is 
helpful as citizenship confines the universe of persons who are meant to be equal, and 
citizenship itself connotes equality). 
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vary from country to country, such that citizenship might prove 
more useful to achieving substantive equality in some countries 
than in others. 
Some of the essays in this volume express doubt that 
recasting the women’s movement in terms of citizenship will 
further the cause of substantive gender equality. This review will 
discuss how the doubters might have the better end of the 
argument. First, to profitably reframe women’s claims as claims 
for equal status as citizens, feminists would have to persuade 
people to accept their concept of citizenship. That concept has 
no accepted meaning. The essays themselves reveal different and 
contested meanings. Second, gender stereotypes infect current 
concepts of citizenship. To reframe arguments for parity as 
claims for equal citizenship status could be to fall prey to those 
stereotypes. Third, recasting the feminist movement as a 
movement for women’s equal status as citizens requires more 
than a simple change in vocabulary or rhetoric. The current 
impediments to achieving substantive equality have their 
foundations in differences in ideology that sharply divide 
Americans, and resolving these conflicts will not be easy 
whatever the rhetoric. Finally, and as Martha Fineman writes in 
her chapter, the concept of equality may not have run its course. 
Equality has achieved a great deal in a relatively short time, 
perhaps because the basic idea of equality lies at the foundation 
of the rule of law—that like cases should be treated alike.29 
This review essay will proceed as follows. Part I summarizes 
Gender Equality’s main working definition of citizenship and the 
aspects of citizenship and gender equality explored in each 
section of the book. Part II critically examines whether 
citizenship could propel the movement for substantive gender 
equality, with examples from Gender Equality to illustrate how 
arguments from citizenship could help this cause. Part III 
explains how gender stereotypes infuse the concept of citizen-
ship. Drawing on research into cognitive frames, this section 
explains that a shift to citizenship could actually impede progress 
toward substantive gender equality. Part IV concludes on a more 
hopeful note. For citizenship to lose its gendered cast, 
stereotypes about families and familial roles must change. Such 
roles have changed dramatically over the past 40 years. They 
continue to do so. Arguments for women’s equality can take 
 
 29. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208 (rev. ed. 2005) (“The rule of law also 
implies the precept that similar cases be treated similarly.”). 
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much of the credit for these changes. The fight from here on out, 
however, will have to be for gender equality, not just women’s 
equality. Norms of masculinity must change, and gender equality 
proponents will have to persuade men that they will benefit in 
the process. 
I. EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATUS 
Gender Equality organizes twenty essays on citizenship into 
several different dimensions—constitutional citizenship, 
democratic citizenship, social citizenship, sexual and 
reproductive citizenship, and global citizenship. 
In this book’s introduction, Professors McClain and 
Grossman describe T. H. Marshall’s30 concept of citizenship as “a 
status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. 
All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights 
and duties with which the status is endowed” (p. 8).31 This focus 
on status, argue Professors McClain and Grossman, “provides an 
opening to investigate not just formal assertions of equal status 
but also more substantive questions about whether community 
members truly have the same rights and opportunities, or 
participate on equal terms” (p. 8). “[E]qual citizenship conveys” 
the “goal[] of equal status for all members of society and its 
ideals of inclusion, membership, and belonging” (p. 1).32 
Citizenship embraces the whole range of “rights, benefits, duties, 
and obligations that members of any society expect to share” 
and the goals of “inclusion, belonging, participation, and civic 
membership” (p. 2). 
This general concept implies three conditions that 
determine whether individuals possess equal status as citizens of 
a nation. Citizens must possess, first, equal civil rights, (for 
example, the right to contract and hold property); second, equal 
political rights, (for example, the right to vote or serve on juries); 
and third, equal social rights. 
 
 30. T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950). 
 31. Quoting T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: 
ESSAYS BY T.H. MARSHALL 84 (1964); see also KARST, supra note 8, at 3 (“The principle 
of equal citizenship, as I use the term, means this: Each individual is presumptively 
entitled to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and partici-
pating member . . . . the principle forbids the organized society to treat the individual as a 
member of an inferior or dependent caste or nonparticipant.”). 
 32. See also KARST, supra note 8, at 3 (emphasizing that the principle of equal 
citizenship “centers on those aspects of equality that are most closely bound to the sense 
of self and the sense of inclusion in a community”). 
!!!MCGOWAN-281-STOPFIGHTFORWOMEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2012 12:59 PM 
148 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:139 
 
The twenty chapters in this collection cover many disparate 
topics related to these categories. The brief summary provided 
here necessarily flattens the subtleties of each chapter’s 
arguments. These twenty essays are grouped into the five parts 
of the volume—constitutional citizenship, political citizenship, 
social citizenship, sexual citizenship, and global citizenship. Each 
chapter of Gender Equality is interesting in its own right, and all 
of the chapters are worth reading by those who care about 
women’s equality in the United States and worldwide. 
Constitutional citizenship refers to civil and political rights 
and the “role that constitutions play in fostering women’s equal 
citizenship and forbidding” sex discrimination (p. 15). This 
section’s essays explore why citizenship has played such a minor 
role in the Supreme Court’s sex equality jurisprudence (p. 23) 
(Rogers M. Smith essay); how the immigration and 
naturalization process in the United States continues to reflect 
and reinforce traditional gender norms and roles (p. 39) (Kerry 
Abrams essay); whether the American bill of rights was built on 
communitarian principles as well as liberal individualist ideals 
(p. 60) (Gretchen Ritter essay); and whether it is possible for a 
country to promote gender equality if it also permits individuals 
to practice religions that, for example, give women and men 
different rights in marriage and divorce (p. 83) (Beverley Baines 
essay) or require women to wear distinctive and modest garb (p. 
107) (Mary Anne Case essay). 
Political citizenship refers to political rights. The chapters in 
this section discuss how traditional models of citizenship are 
primarily built around masculine activities and how arguing for 
equal citizenship status might change that. For example, one 
chapter explores whether reframing abortion as implicating 
women’s citizenship status could transform the abortion debate 
from the current, seemingly intractable conflict between women 
and fetuses’ rights (p. 154) (Nancy J. Hirschmann essay). Two 
chapters in this section explore why so few women hold political 
office. One of them investigates whether sex quotas for political 
office increase the number of women representatives and 
meaningfully improve women’s “representation” (p. 174) (Anne 
Peters & Stefan Suter essay). The other describes the author’s 
study of why some countries elect significantly more women to 
high political office than others (p. 201) (Eileen McDonagh 
essay). Three women-led anti-war movements are another 
chapter’s subject. This chapter uncovers the traditional gender 
stereotypes that underlie concepts of good citizenship. These 
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stereotypes, the chapter explains, both facilitate and undermine 
these movements’ tactics and effectiveness (p. 131) (Kathryn 
Abrams essay). 
Social citizenship refers to the “material preconditions for 
effective participation in society” (p. 17). Joanna Grossman 
writes of the “importance of paid work to women’s full 
participation in society . . .” (p. 239). American law denies 
women full social citizenship, she argues, because it denies 
women the right to reasonable accommodation of the physical 
limitations being pregnant sometimes impose on them. Another 
describes how the American tax system tends to decrease 
women’s status as citizens (p. 267) (Martha T. McCluskey essay). 
Martha Fineman’s chapter describes how she is less optimistic 
about citizenship’s possibilities for gender equality (p. 251). She 
is concerned that citizenship’s orientation toward activities in the 
public sphere will distract from what she considers to be the 
main determinant of women’s inequality—the status quo’s 
failure to recognize humanity’s essential vulnerability. Ignoring 
vulnerability has pushed the issue into the private realm, where 
women shoulder the lion’s share of the burden of caring for 
those vulnerable people. 
Sexual and reproductive citizenship refers to questions about 
the legitimacy of government interest in regulating families, 
sexuality, and reproduction. One chapter describes how “sexual 
outlaws” (gay men and lesbians, sexually assertive single 
women) “have demanded inclusion” in mainstream life and have 
“begun to revise and expand the meaning of citizenship by 
claiming their rights” (p. 291) (Brenda Cossman essay). “In so 
doing, they have contributed to the politicization of the . . . 
private sphere” (p. 291), which may have encouraged some 
Christian organizations to encourage married partners to 
celebrate their sexuality and become more adventurous. 
Another chapter questions whether queer theory has been too 
quick to celebrate sexual transgression as always liberating, and 
gender theory to condemn sex as invariably oppressive (p. 307) 
(Maxine Eichner essay). Two chapters focus on reproduction. 
One argues that the usual view of infertility as a private, medical 
problem that implicates only negative liberties ignores how 
crucial parenthood is to citizenship. Parenthood accords people 
full “‘recognition’ by one’s fellow citizens” and “full membership 
in the civic community” (p. 327) (Mary Lyndon Shanley essay).33 
 
 33. Quoting JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR 
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The decision whether or not to have children is crucial to 
individual identity and our concept of the “good life” (p. 327). 
The second discusses the importance of reproductive rights to 
women’s citizenship (p. 345) (Barbara Stark essay), describing 
their codification in international treaties and conventions (p. 
346–50), and noting how bearing the next generation of citizen 
has traditionally been considered to be the role of women 
citizens (pp. 345–46). In particular, this chapter considers the 
effect of both pro- and anti-natalist policies on women’s status 
and the implications of laws permitting or banning sex selective 
abortions. 
Global citizenship, the volume’s final section, explores how 
international human rights norms have sometimes undermined 
women’s status as citizens and sometimes sparked successful 
feminist movements. For example, Regina Austin examines 
three documentaries about the murders of more than 300 
women over a twelve-year period in Ciudad Juarez, a city on the 
United States/Mexico border (p. 359). Rampant criminality—
drugs, prostitution, human smuggling, and a high rate of 
emigration of women from their homes and families in Mexico’s 
interior—made the women of Ciudad Juarez vulnerable to their 
serial murder (pp. 362–64). Many of the women who were killed 
were newcomers and suspected prostitutes. Police gave low 
priority to investigating their murders. Border crime stretched 
the city’s criminal justice system nearly to the breaking point and 
powerful drug lords and human smugglers corrupted it with 
bribes and threats. Austin describes that these women’s families 
demanded justice for their loved ones by portraying these 
women’s murders as a denial of citizenship—the right to safety, 
to justice, to move freely within Mexico, and the right “to 
peace . . . for families” (p. 371).34 
How domestic violence stopped being just a private, family 
issue and became a human rights issue” that impairs women’s 
full participation in society is the subject of other chapters in this 
section. One argues that framing domestic violence as depriving 
women of full citizenship is crucial to its eradication (p. 378) 
(Elizabeth M. Schneider essay). Another documents the 
progress toward achieving women’s equal rights as citizens in 
Muslim countries where citizenship rights are filtered through a 
religious law that conceives of men’s and women’s roles as 
 
INCLUSION 100 (1991). 
 34. Alteration in original. 
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essentially different (p. 390) (Anisseh Van Engeland-Nourai 
essay). The final chapter describes how global human rights 
norms have supported grassroots efforts to push for women’s 
equal status as citizens in many different countries (p. 409) 
(Deborah M. Weissman essay). This chapter warns feminists that 
the United States has on several occasions used the denial of 
women’s rights or the abuse of women as an excuse for invading 
a country or to increase the United States’ power and influence 
in that country (p. 420–25). Feminist human rights activists must 
take care not to unwittingly become tools of United States 
foreign policy. 
Having briefly summarized the essays in this collection, let 
me now discuss this collection’s main thesis—that staking 
women’s claims to equality on their rights as citizens could 
alleviate some of the perennial problems in the fight for 
women’s equality. 
II. DO CLAIMS BASED ON EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 
STATUS AVOID THE LIMITATIONS OF ARGUMENTS 
FOR EQUALITY? 
Professors McClain and Grossman argue in their intro-
duction to this collection that at least three main legal barriers 
have stymied progress toward women’s equality in the United 
States, and basing women’s claims on citizenship could remove 
these barriers. First, only intentional discrimination based on a 
person’s sex violates the Equal Protection Clause. Policies with 
disparate impact do undermine a group’s citizenship rights and 
their status as citizens. 
Second, the Equal Protection Clause applies only to the 
state or state officials, so women cannot sue private persons for 
constitutional violations. This state action requirement also 
denies Congress the authority to remedy private discrimination,35 
unless state officials have a hand in the discrimination36 or the 
discrimination substantially affects interstate commerce.37 
Private persons can, however, affect the citizenship status of 
others, much as private acts can impose badges and incidents of 
slavery.38 
 
 35. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3, 11 (1883).  
 36. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755–56 (1966).  
 37. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.  
 38. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968).  
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Third, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, at most, 
freedom from state interference with individual choice. The 
Court has been reluctant to rule that the Fourteenth 
Amendment creates entitlements to state services.39 Claims of 
equal citizenship status might, however, provide a basis for 
claiming entitlements to certain state services or policies. 
None of the chapters in this volume discuss where textual 
authority might be found in the Constitution for the guarantee of 
equal citizenship status. A few possibilities include the 
Nineteenth Amendment, as Reva Siegel has documented how 
this amendment was intended to guarantee women’s equal 
citizenship status,40 and the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which could empower Congress to legislate to 
remedy the unequal citizenship status of some groups. The 
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery has been interpreted to 
include badges and incidents of slavery, and unequal citizenship 
status might represent such a badge. 
A. WOMEN’S CLAIMS FOR EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATUS COULD 
MAKE POLICIES WITH DISPARATE IMPACT AGAINST WOMEN 
CONSTITUTIONALLY VULNERABLE 
In the first essay Rogers Smith points that the Supreme 
Court rarely discusses women’s citizenship in its sex equality 
cases. Citizenship lies at the margins of women’s equality 
jurisprudence, Smith argues, because laws with disparate impact 
are usually constitutional. Using the lens of equal protection, the 
Court sees the harms to women resulting from policies or laws 
with disparate impact as being caused by some factor other than 
their sex. According to Smith, most discrimination is invisible to 
the Court, as most formal barriers to women’s equality have 
been demolished (pp. 23–24). Many laws, policies, and practices 
with disparate impact, however, still impede women from full-
fledged citizenship. 
Smith presents United States v. Morrison as his main 
example of the Court’s refusal to acknowledge how disparate 
 
 39. There are limited exceptions to this rule, most prominently, the state’s 
obligation to provide an indigent person with assistance of counsel. State and federal 
courts must also waive most court filing fees if a person is too poor to pay them.  
 40. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 968 (2002) [hereinafter Siegel, She 
the People] (“I argue for reading the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments together 
because the two Amendments are linked in subject matter concern: each secures 
constitutional protection for values of equal citizenship.”). 
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impact undermines women’s citizenship. In that case, the Court 
nullified major parts of the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA), which had given women a “[f]ederal civil rights cause 
of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender” 
(p. 25).41 Citing the Civil Rights Cases42 for the proposition that 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discriminatory state 
action, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Congress lacked power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to create such a 
cause of action against private individuals. His citation to the 
Civil Rights Cases was notable, as the Court had not relied upon 
it as authority for almost 40 years. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
conceded that the congressional record had indeed 
demonstrated “pervasive bias in various state justice systems 
against victims of gender-motivated violence” (p. 26).43 But, 
VAWA’s cause of action did not remedy constitutional 
violations by these state officials—it made an end run around 
them. Smith argues that VAWA protected women’s status as 
citizens by combating private violence against women, thereby 
increasing women’s freedom, autonomy, full civic participation, 
and ability to engage in citizenship activities pp. (26–27). No 
Justices in Morrison, however, so much as mentioned that 
VAWA would “combat behavior that had long contributed to 
women’s subordination in their civic roles” (p. 27). 
Nor does Nevada v. Hibbs44 mention citizenship. Hibbs is 
the late Chief Justice’s other opinion about Congress’s power to 
promote sex equality. There, in an apparent about-face, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) as validly enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
FMLA gave parents the right to 12 weeks of unpaid leave from 
work to care for a newborn child.45 The Chief Justice was 
persuaded that Congress had solid evidence that states had 
continued “to rely on invalid gender stereotypes in . . . the 
administration of [familial] leave benefits.”46 Smith objects that 
FMLA’s meager, unpaid leave provisions can hardly be expected 
to change the fact that women still carry “disproportionate 
responsibilit[y] for family and household care” (p. 32). Smith 
argues that were Congress to legislate to guarantee women’s 
 
 41. Quoting 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). 
 42. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 43. Quoting United States v. Morrison, 528 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000). 
 44. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 45. Id. at 724 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (1993)). 
 46. Id. at 730. 
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“full citizenship stature”47 it could justify “a massive 
restructuring of” the provision of “child care, housework, and 
marketplace employment” (p. 33). Women still shoulder most 
childcare and housework, and that fact, Smith argues, limits their 
economic, political, and social status (pp. 32–33). 
However much laws and policies with disparate impact 
undermine women’s status as citizens, Smith doubts that the 
Court is the right institution to attack such laws and policies (pp. 
34–35). He worries that disparate impact challenges would mire 
the Court in a deep morass of policymaking (p.36), much like the 
one the Court fell into in the 1970s. Then, district courts found 
themselves running school districts, mental hospitals, and 
prisons. The same institutional constraints on court power and 
democratic legitimacy that hampered the courts’ success in 
running those institutions, Smith argues, would likely plague 
courts today if they routinely evaluated the constitutionality of 
laws with disparate impact. 
Smith may be too quick to conclude that disparate impact 
would ensnare courts in policymaking inconsistent with their 
role. In his article, “In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination 
Principle,” Paul Brest argued that the “anti-discrimination 
principle” encompassed one kind of state-sponsored discrim-
ination that had fallen beneath the radar screen of the Court’s 
intentional discrimination jurisprudence: policymakers’ selective 
indifference to the burdens their policies impose on people of 
color.48 Brest could have added women, too. Because of 
legislatures’ selective indifference, they may overlook the costs 
that laws with significant disparate impact impose on women and 
other minority groups. 
Scrutinizing laws with disparate impact, moreover, does not 
inevitably force the court to intrude on legislative turf. The 
Court could, for example, strike laws with significant disparate 
impact on the basis of race or sex if a legislature has not 
specifically considered the law’s disparate impact and concluded 
that, despite its disparate impact, the law was still a rational way 
to achieve particular policy aims. Such a test would be similar to 
clear statement rules that the Court has adopted in its sovereign 
immunity cases.49 Were the Court to strike a law with disparate 
 
 47. Quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996). 
 48. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1976).  
 49. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996) (quoting 
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impact on such grounds, a legislature could re-enact the law after 
laying the factual groundwork to support the legislation’s 
importance despite the costs of its disparate impact, or it could 
consider different policies with less disparate impact. Sending a 
law back to the legislature does two useful things. It spotlights 
the law’s disparate impact, which gives interest groups an 
opportunity to weigh in on the law’s costs to their group; and it 
forces the legislature to face up to the law’s disparate impact, its 
costs, and either to justify the disparate impact in light of other 
benefits or to consider different alternatives.50 In all cases, the 
Court’s action forces the legislature to consider the harms to the 
group in its deliberations. 
Even if the Court did not agree that the principle of equal 
citizenship status called the constitutionality of laws with 
disparate impact into question, that principle might moderate 
the Court’s growing hostility to disparate impact claims. Two 
years ago, the Court held in Ricci v. DeStefano that the City of 
New Haven violated the Equal Protection Clause by inten-
tionally discriminating against white firefighters when it 
discarded a promotion test because it had a racially disparate 
impact on African Americans and Latinos.51 When the City 
discarded the test because too few African Americans and 
Latinos passed the test, its decision was based on race. The 
Court’s analysis in that case called into question the 
constitutionality of any government attempts to avoid using 
policies, tests, and practices with disparate impact; indeed, Title 
VII’s prohibition against disparate impact by private companies 
could also be constitutionally vulnerable. But the principle of 
equal citizenship status might persuade the Court to back away 
from declaring disparate impact law unconstitutional. 
 
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1989)) (“Congress may abrogate the States’ 
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention 
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”) . 
 50. Paul Brest made a similar suggestion to cure the Palmer v. Thompson 
situation—where there is evidence that discriminatory animus motivated the legislature, 
but the law formally has no disparate impact. Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An 
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUPR. CT. REV. 95. 
He argued that the Court should strike laws when evidence demonstrates that discrim-
inatory animus motivated a law’s passage. Id. at 130–31. True, a legislature might just 
reenact the legislation and try to conceal its discriminatory animus better the second time 
around. Forcing the legislature to reenact the law still forces it to articulate race or sex 
neutral purposes for its action (which it might lack), and a reenacted law lies under a 
cloud of suspicion of illicit motivation if no new compelling reasons for its passage can be 
cited. Id. at 125–27.  
 51. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678–79 (2009). 
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Joanna Grossman argues that the United States’ 
indifference to laws and policies with disparate impact on 
pregnant women undermines women’s full social citizenship (p. 
240). Pregnancy, she argues, can sometimes temporarily 
interfere with a woman’s ability to work. Title VII guarantees 
pregnant women only formal equality—an employer may not 
assume that pregnancy or impending motherhood limits a 
woman’s ability or commitment to work. Employers also 
shoulder a relatively light duty to reasonably accommodate the 
work limitations pregnancy or childbirth may impose—
employers must only accommodate such limitations if and to the 
extent that it already reasonably accommodates other temporary 
disabilities.52 Many employers do in fact provide such leaves to 
employees who are temporarily disabled from work. Some lower 
courts, however, have further limited the usefulness to pregnant 
women of this reasonable accommodation aspect of Title VII. 
Some have held employers only to a duty of reasonable 
accommodation of pregnancy if they accommodate temporary 
disabilities due to off-the-job injuries. 
Many pregnant women want only relatively minor 
accommodations—temporary relief from heavy lifting, changes 
in work schedules to accommodate morning sickness or to 
relieve women from late shifts, etc.—not a leave from work 
entirely (pp. 245–46). Federal statutes provide no help, 
Grossman contends because they do not give a woman the right 
to reasonable work accommodations (pp. 245–46). Many lower 
courts have also read Title VII’s accommodation requirement to 
bar claims by women that neutral policies have a disparate 
impact on pregnant workers (pp. 246–47). Only the most 
stringent work requirements, such as a policy that denies all 
workers any leave during the first year of employment, have 
fallen to disparate impact challenge.53 
Grossman argues that the lack of pregnancy 
accommodations undermines women’s full status as citizens. 
Work has a “multifaceted” relationship to citizenship (p. 237). A 
 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2011) (providing that “women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work”).  
 53. U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991). But see 
Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861–62 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing a 
disparate impact challenge to a policy that limited an employee’s leave to three days 
within the first ninety days of employment).  
!!!MCGOWAN-281-STOPFIGHTFORWOMEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2012 12:59 PM 
2012] BOOK REVIEWS 157 
 
person’s work affects her self-conception, the conceptions others 
have of her, her relationships, her dignity. Work also gives her 
the means to exercise her independence and a forum where she 
can discuss politics and national and world events with others (p. 
237). “[A]ccess to decent, paid work is one measure of a 
society’s commitment to equality and its success in integrating all 
citizens as full participants in society” (p. 237). As Judith Shklar 
has written, “We are citizens only if we ‘earn’” (p. 237).54 
Equal access to paid work has increased women’s status as 
citizens by making economic independence possible and 
permitting women to choose to work either outside or inside the 
home. Yet, claims of pregnancy discrimination have soared over 
the last decade and a half.55 Courts have limited Title VII’s 
protections for pregnant workers further by refusing to permit 
most women’s disparate impact challenges. More data about 
pregnant workers would strengthen this chapter’s argument that 
women’s equal status as citizens depends on pregnancy 
accommodations, such as how commonly pregnant women need 
light-duty assignments or how commonly pregnancy complica-
tions require women to take temporary leave from work. 
Statistics indicating pregnant women’s vulnerability to firing or 
demotion certainly suggest discriminatory intent toward 
pregnant workers. But such discrimination could reflect 
employers’ stereotypes about a mother’s commitment to work, 
rather than annoyance over a minor work accommodation. 
Kerry Abrams’s chapter, Becoming a Citizen: Marriage, 
Immigration, and Assimilation, argues that federal law governing 
permanent United States residency primarily benefits men. 
Skilled workers—people with formal training or post-secondary 
degrees—receive most employment-based green cards, and most 
skilled immigrant workers are men. The majority of women 
receive green cards derivatively through their husbands, and the 
United States does not automatically award spouses green cards. 
A green-card-holding spouse must sponsor his or her spouse. 
Sponsorship is optional, and it imposes a heavy support 
obligation on the sponsoring spouse that survives divorce. A 
spouse must swear that he or she can support his or her spouse 
at least at a level one and a quarter times the federal poverty line 
 
 54. Quoting SHKLAR, supra note 33, at 67.  
 55. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Pregnancy Discrimination Charges 
EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997—FY 2010, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/pregnancy.cfm (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).  
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(p. 53). No income earned by the sponsored spouse counts 
toward this amount. 
The structure of sponsorship makes sponsored spouses 
vulnerable to exploitation and coercion. The threat not to 
sponsor can keep a wife in an abusive relationship. A husband 
can refuse to sponsor his wife and either leave her in the home 
country or force her to live illegally in the United States. 
Congress recognized that immigration law puts many women at 
the mercy of their husbands, and the Violence against Women 
Act of 1994 created exception to spousal sponsorship if a person 
can prove that her spouse has “battered” her or “subjected” her 
“to extreme cruelty” (p. 55).56 VAWA’s requirement subjects 
women to further indignities, Abrams argues, by extending 
residency to women because of their victimhood, not their value 
as potential citizens (pp. 56–57). 
United States immigration law reinforces women’s inferior 
status in other ways, Abrams argues. It encourages green card 
recipients to perform traditional gender roles within marriages. 
Green cards’ skilled work requirement disproportionately 
screens out many foreign women who were denied equal 
educational opportunities in their home countries. The spousal 
support obligation encourages a traditional model of marriage, 
which increases dependent spouses’ vulnerability. The 
sponsoring spouse’s income alone counts toward the obligation. 
None of a recipient spouse’s own earnings count. 
Abrams proposes three solutions. First, the United States 
should eliminate the sponsorship requirement—spouses of 
persons who receive employment-based green cards should 
automatically be eligible to apply for a green card without 
spousal consent. Second, the United States should either 
eliminate the support requirement or base the support 
requirement on total family income. The latter would encourage 
spouses to work outside the home for pay, which would decrease 
their dependency. Finally, she argues that childcare should 
qualify as a skilled work category, and employers should be able 
to sponsor an immigrant if they can prove they are unable to find 
an American to provide childcare. 
Abrams’ first suggestion gives the most pause. In many 
cities, it is claimed that finding a nanny is hard, and Abrams’ 
suggestion implies that this is her assumption. Is it the case, 
 
 56. Quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (2008). 
!!!MCGOWAN-281-STOPFIGHTFORWOMEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2012 12:59 PM 
2012] BOOK REVIEWS 159 
 
however, that American women shun the task of taking care of 
others’ children? Quite the opposite would seem to be true, if 
preschool and kindergarten teachers are any guide. Finding a 
nanny at minimum wage is certainly tough, as the average wage 
for nannies in major metropolitan areas such as New York, Los 
Angeles, and Washington, D.C. is over $16 per hour. At first 
blush, it might sound high, but it works out to about $33,280 per 
year on a forty-hour week—barely a living wage in these 
communities.57 It is certainly not so high that it indicates a 
profound shortage of nannies, particularly as those who cannot 
afford full-time, one-on-one care for their children have other 
childcare options, such as in-home daycare, institutional daycare, 
and preschool. 
B. CITIZENSHIP PROVIDES A BASIS FOR DEMANDING POSITIVE 
ENTITLEMENTS 
More American women vote than men, but women hold 
only 15% of the seats in the House of Representatives (pp. 201, 
202) (Eileen McDonagh essay) and seventeen of the 100 seats in 
the Senate.58 No woman has ever been president, and only two 
women, the late Geraldine Ferraro and Sarah Palin, have been 
on her party’s presidential ticket. Among democracies, the 
United States ranks eighty-third out of 118 countries in the 
proportion of women who hold public office (Table 9.1, p. 203). 
Only in Ireland, Greece and France do women hold a smaller 
proportion of their national legislature’s seats (p. 203). Rwanda 
leads the world—in 2006, women held almost 49% of the seats in 
its national legislature (p. 203). Sweden comes in second with 
45%; the other Scandinavian countries follow in fourth, fifth, 
and sixth place—Norway, Finland, and Denmark respectively (p. 
203). The Netherlands holds seventh place (p. 203). 
Two chapters in this volume address women’s 
representation in national office. Representation, Discrimination, 
and Democracy: A Legal Assessment of Gender Quotas in 
Politics, by Anne Peters and Stefan Suter, discusses sex-quotas 
for political office, which about 100 countries throughout the 
world have implemented (p. 176). “Sex quotas” vary from 
 
 57. International Nanny Association, 2011 International Nanny Association Salary 
and Benefits Survey, http://www.nanny.org/document.doc?id=7 (last visited Nov. 20, 
2011) (reporting results of 2010 salary survey).  
 58. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP IN THE 111TH 
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 2 ’(December 27, 2010), available at http://www.senate.gov/ 
CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%260BL%29PL%3B%3D%0A. 
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voluntary “soft targets” to specific constitutional provisions 
reserving some parliamentary seats for women only, and they 
are not equally effective. Citizenship and Women’s Election to 
Political Office: The Power of Gendered Public Policies, by 
Eileen McDonagh, explores why some western democracies 
have a strikingly higher proportion of women holding national 
political office than others (p. 201). Both chapters agree that 
gender quotas help ensure women’s equal status as citizens, 
because such policies communicate that women belong in 
positions of power (pp. 199–200, 207). 
Peters and Suter, however, argue counterintuitively that 
quotas have only modestly increased the number of women 
serving in national parliament: “The average level of 
representation for women in political bodies in countries with 
electoral quotas is only slightly higher than the worldwide 
average of 18.4 percent of female parliamentarians” (p. 197).59 
Peters and Suter explain that quotas come in several different 
varieties. Not all are, well, quotas. Furthermore, quotas are most 
effective in parliamentary systems with proportionate 
representation. The most effective quotas, furthermore, specify 
the minimum percentage of women to be included on a party 
candidate list and specify women’s placement on such lists (p. 
198). Enforcement, finally, makes or breaks quota schemes (p. 
198). France’s 50% quota, for example, requires parties to 
submit “zippered” candidate lists—a list that alternates male and 
female candidates60—or have their public campaign-funding cut. 
Similarly, Spain has a 40% quota and specifies that women 
comprise at least 40% of candidates in each tranche of 5 posts on 
a list. Noncompliant lists will not be placed on the ballot (p. 177 
n.19). 
The heart of Peters and Suter’s chapter scrutinizes whether 
sex quotas improve “representation” in electoral bodies. Here, 
 
 59. McDonagh concurs: “[T]he net gain of gender quotas for democracies is a 
percentage increase of 3.929 percent” (p. 224).  
 60. The efficacy of France’s quota seems surprising in light of McDonagh’s statistic 
that women held only 12% of the seats in the national legislature in 2006. France, 
however, first adopted a quota system in 2000, and it did not initially require party 
candidate lists to alternate men and women (a “zippered” list). Consequently, parties 
placed many women candidates near the bottom of candidate lists, and few were elected. 
“The number of female deputies [in the French National Assembly] increased” from 
10.9% in 1997 to just 12.3%” in 2002. Priscilla L. Southwell & Courtney P. Smith, 
Equality of Recruitment: Gender Parity in French National Assembly Elections, 44 SOC. 
SCI. J. 83, 85 (2007). In 2007, France changed its scheme to ensure women’s placement on 
parties’ lists (p. 177 n.16).  
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the authors interestingly and usefully parse the meaning of 
“representation.” They argue that if women representatives 
actually represent women’s interests, concerns, and needs better 
than men, then quotas create “substantive” representation (p. 
190). Quotas could also create “parity” of representation if 
proportionate sex representation is inherently good in and of 
itself (p. 192). Finally, quotas could create “symbolic” 
representation by creating the image that women belong in 
power (p. 194). The “absence of women [political leaders] 
reinforces strong . . . assumptions about [women’s] inferiority,” 
Peters and Suter argue (p. 194). More women in “elected 
assemblies . . . more powerful[ly] and more visib[ly] assert[s] 
women’s equality with men than changing the composition of 
the professions.” Women who visibly possess political power not 
only counter traditional stereotypes but also “raise female 
aspirations,” encourage other women to enter politics, and 
broaden women’s “career and life choices.” (p. 194). 
“Substantive representation” is a nonstarter according to 
Peters and Suter. It is not true “that women . . . have specific 
interests and needs” that women politicians also possess (p. 190). 
There is no “women’s” position on most issues, and the “gender 
gap” between men and women’s positions is usually small (pp. 
194–96). Second, the related idea that women have different 
leadership styles (more bottom-up than authoritarian), skills 
(more empathetic and better listeners), and values (more 
cooperative and altruistic) (p. 190) “ressurect[s] dormant gender 
stereotypes” (pp. 191–92). This rationale undermines women 
political leaders—powerful women are “deviant,” and softness is 
weakness (p. 191). 
Furthermore, parity standing alone violates the principle of 
democratic accountability. It is incoherent to suggest that a 
woman can be held accountable for who she is. 
Generally, a woman cannot be held accountable for what she 
is, but for what she does. But how can elected women carry an 
additional responsibility to represent women? Is there a 
mandate of difference attached to women politicians, even in 
the absence of mechanisms to establish special accountability? 
(p. 193). 
Requiring women to carry the additional responsibility of 
representing women unfairly burdens women leaders. It also 
violates the idea that leaders should be accountable to all 
citizens (p. 193). 
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Peters and Suter are much more positive about symbolic 
representation. Sex parity in power achieves more than propor-
tionate representation. “Underneath the deceptive simplicity of 
the arrangements for parity democracy lies the much more 
complex function of representation. Because politics is . . . about 
self-image . . . gender parity has a powerful” symbolic meaning 
(p. 194). Substantial numbers of women in national leadership 
reflects women’s equal status and “potentially” could multiply 
“the rights and the position of all women” (p. 194). Indeed, all 
by themselves, debates about gender quotas improve women’s 
status simply by elevating the issue of women’s leadership to 
national importance (p. 194). 
Eileen McDonagh studies the issue of women’s 
representation from a slightly different angle. She describes her 
regression analysis that shows that Western democracies without 
strong social welfare policies tend to elect fewer women to 
higher office. The proportion of women elected to public office, 
Professor McDonagh argues, depends on whether a country 
associates maternal characteristics with good government. 
Countries that have had women monarchs and those that have 
strong social welfare policies have elected more women to 
national public office. According to 2006 data, western 
democracies that lead in the proportion of women elected to 
office include Sweden (45%),61 Costa Rica (39%),62 Norway 
(38%),63 Finland (37.5%),64 Denmark (37%),65 the Netherlands 
(37%),66 and Spain (36%).67 The United States has had no 
monarch, woman or otherwise, it is one of only two 
industrialized democracies that has not had “any form of social 
or biological citizenship” in the form of welfare provisions, 
gender quotas, or a hereditary monarchy in which a woman can 
ascend to the throne.68 Women hold 16% of the seats in 
 
 61. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments, http://www. 
ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif311206.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2011) (providing 2006 
statistics).   
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68.  McDonagh also lists France, but France adopted gender quotas after her study 
was completed. See supra note 60. 
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Congress.69  Japan is the other such country. There, women held 
about 11% of the seats in its national legislature.70 
Social welfare policies, McDonagh argues, signify women’s 
legitimate place in power and in politics (pp. 221–22). They also 
“free women to enter the paid workforce” and “provide public 
sector jobs that disproportionately employ women.”71 Women’s 
increased participation in paid work changes their political 
interests and makes them ardent supporters of the very same 
policies that enabled them to work outside of the home.72 Their 
changing political views, in turn, create an ideological gender 
gap among parties that can be exploited by promoting more 
women candidates (p. 222). 
C. PRIVATE PERSONS—AS WELL AS PUBLIC POLICIES—
UNDERMINE WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATUS 
As the earlier discussion in Part A explained, the Civil 
Rights Cases held that Congress had the power to pass laws 
preventing discrimination by state actors, but not by private 
persons, because only state action violated the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 In the 1960s, the Court 
skirted this restriction on Congress’s remedial power by 
construing Congress’s commerce power generously enough to 
cover discrimination in public accommodations74 and its section 
five, Fourteenth Amendment powers generously enough to 
cover private conspiracies to deny an individual’s civil rights 
because of his race.75 United States v. Morrison, however, revived 
the Civil Rights Cases’s limitations on both Congress’s section 
five and its commerce clause powers. 
 
 69.  See Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra note 61.   
 70.  Japan is missing from McDonagh’s table on the percentage of women elected 
to the national legislature in 2006. I derived this figure from 2011 statistics provided by 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union. According to that data, the United States ranked 91st out 
of 187 countries and Japan ranked 126th.  See id.  
 71. Frances Rosenbluth et al., Welfare Works: Explaining Female Legislative 
Representation, 2 POL. & GENDER 165, 165 (2006).  
 72. “[W]elfare state policies that free women from previously held family duties 
provide increased opportunities for women to work outside the home in any field. Such 
policies also induce women to involve themselves in politics in order to protect the broad 
gender equity gains that welfare state policies achieve. Generous welfare state policies 
thus provide the motive and opportunity for women to enter legislative politics.” Frances 
Rosenbluth, Welfare Works: Explaining Female Legislative Representation, 2 POL. & 
GENDER 165, 182 (2006). 
 73. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
 74. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach 
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).  
 75. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1966). 
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The Equal Protection Clause’s “state action” requirement, 
however, does not constrain congressional powers provided by 
the other Reconstruction amendments. Private people, for 
example, can impose “badges and incidents” of slavery on 
others.76 The Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause could 
also be given substantive bite. So interpreted, private persons 
could undermine another’s citizenship status, just as private acts 
create badges and incidents of slavery. Such an interpretation 
could give Congress the power to make it illegal for private 
individuals to undermine the citizenship status of others. This 
part of the Fourteenth Amendment could be interpreted to give 
Congress the power to pass legislation like the Violence against 
Women Act. Reva Siegel has argued that the 19th Amendment 
might also be a basis for Congress to pass this and similar 
legislation.77 A few of the essays in this volume discuss how 
actions traditionally deemed “private” undermine women’s 
equal status as citizens. 
For example, Elizabeth Schneider argues, Americans have 
not fully appreciated how domestic violence undermines 
women’s citizenship rights (pp. 378–79, 384–85). Domestic 
violence prevents a woman from belonging fully to our society 
and polity by imprisoning her in the home—an abuser often 
interprets a victim’s leaving the house as a threat to his control 
over her. “Whether it is being able to get an education, go to 
work, participate in civic or self-help activities, exercise the right 
to vote, or attend a meeting, the various forms of citizenship and 
aspects of broader participation in civil society are important to 
women but enormously threatening to the battering relation-
ship” (p. 384). 
The United States has made significant progress since the 
nineteenth century when violence was accepted as a husband’s 
prerogative over his wife, Schneider says (pp. 379–80). Now, it 
constitutes a crime just the same as other batteries and crimes 
against persons. Criminalization should not be a society’s only 
response to domestic violence, Schneider argues, because 
 
 76. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (holding that refusal 
of whites to sell or rent houses to blacks would deny them a civil right in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 and thus create a badge or incident of slavery); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3, 35–36 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 77. Siegel, She the People, supra note 40, at 1036 (“The Nineteenth Amendment is 
thus powerful precedent for federal regulation that enforces equal citizenship norms in 
matters concerning family life . . . [and it shows]  . . . that the nation has not always 
adhered to a tradition of localism in matters concerning the family.”). 
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criminalization requires women who want to end the violence in 
their relationship to destroy their relationship, too (pp. 382–83). 
Children make it practically impossible to end a relationship 
completely, as parental visitation rights may require a woman to 
continue to engage with an abusive ex (p. 382). 
States generally fail to give abused women adequate legal 
help to protect themselves from their abusers, Schneider argues 
(p. 382). The Constitution does not require them to provide legal 
aid to battered women to help them obtain restraining orders or 
negotiate family law disputes with abusive spouses, such as 
divorce settlements and custody disputes (pp. 387–88). 
Immigrants and women of color have particular trouble getting 
police to protect them at all, Schneider says (p. 382). Police, 
indeed, have no legal duty to protect them, as courts will not 
hold state officials liable for failing to protect women from their 
abusers, even when a woman has a civil protective order (p. 382). 
Demonstrating that domestic violence affects women’s equal 
citizenship status, Schneider argues, could at least “create 
greater pressure for . . . state-funded legal representation” (p. 
388) for women who need protective orders or help with family 
law issues such as divorce or custody. It might also create a 
positive right to police protection from abusive spouses. 
Mary Anne Case approaches the public/private issue from a 
slightly different angle. She rejects the liberal tolerance of 
distinctive religious dress for women and supports bans on 
Muslim women wearing headscarves and burqas in public (pp. 
107–08). Several different European countries have banned veils 
and burqas in some public places. France’s 2004 ban on girls 
wearing headscarves to public school is the most famous. (The 
prohibition extends to other religious garb such as yarmulkes, 
turbans, or large crosses, as well). In the fall of 2010, France 
went even further and banned full-face veils in public.78 France 
has also denied citizenship to a woman because she wore a 
burqa-like garment called a niqab. France’s justification was that 
this woman was insufficiently assimilated into French culture 
(pp. 113–14). Accounts differ about the degree to which this 
woman was isolated. Case writes that this woman left her 
apartment only when her husband or a male relative 
accompanied her. In a New York Times interview, however, this 
woman, Faiza Silmi, said that she “leave[s] the house when [she] 
 
 78. Steven Erlanger, France: Full-Face Veil Ban Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2010, at A8. 
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please[s],” has her own car, and shops on her own.79 Germany 
prohibits public school teachers from wearing headscarves. 
Denmark has recently prohibited Muslim judges from wearing 
headscarves when they are on the bench,80 and some parts of 
Belgium ban girls from wearing headscarves to school.81 
These public displays of religious belief undermine the 
citizenship status of all women, Case contends (pp. 120–21). 
State toleration of the public veiling of women implicitly 
indicates the acceptability of women’s submission and inferiority 
to men; that toleration communicates the state’s equivocal 
commitment to gender equality. Other norms, such as religious 
freedom, trump feminism (pp. 118–19). Consequently, Case 
argues, countries that are dedicated to women’s equality can 
justify prohibiting women from wearing distinctive religious 
dress in public (pp. 114–15). 
The belief that women and men are equal forms a central 
part of the identity of some individuals and some societies, much 
as religion does in others, Case argues (p. 110). Such persons and 
countries are “feminist fundamentalists” (pp. 107, 110). Their 
beliefs should carry as much weight as religious beliefs. 
Feminism is a fragile, new cultural norm that is not universally 
recognized—far from it. The belief that men and women are 
equal will survive only if countries actively protect it. Just as 
countries with official religions pass laws ensuring proper respect 
for the official religion, Case says feminist countries can ensure 
that citizens’ public actions do not disparage feminism (p. 122).82 
Case may take her argument too far. A nation that tolerates 
the covering of women in public might communicate higher 
regard for some principles besides feminism, such as official 
tolerance of religious diversity or government neutrality with 
regard to matters of conscience, but it does not always do so. 
 
 79. Katrin Bennhold, A Veil Closes France’s Door to Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, July 
19, 2008, at A1.  
 80. Thomas Buch-Andersen, Row over Denmark Court Veil Ban, BBC NEWS, May 
19, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7409072.stm. “[T]he ban will include 
crucifixes, Jewish skull caps and turbans as well as headscarves,” but “the move is seen as 
being largely aimed at Muslim judges.” Id. 
 81. “700 schools in the northern region of Flanders, including some in Brussels” 
ban schoolchildren from wearing headscarves to school. Belgian schools ban Muslim 
headscarf: tribunal, AFP, Sep. 11, 2009, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/ 
afp/article/ALeqM5jOauREYO-pnsKGlhSblF0ys0679A. 
 82. Case also argues that countries should be permitted to reject citizenship 
applications by individuals who plainly disagree with the proposition of sex equality. To 
ensure that such policies do not disproportionately screen out women, countries should 
probe male applicants’ commitment to sex equality.  
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Policymakers could believe that bans undermine women’s 
equality if male family members prohibited uncovered women 
from leaving the house or attending school. (Over forty girls 
were expelled from school because they refused to remove their 
headscarves in school following the 2004 French ban.)83 Indeed, 
permitting veiling might be the best way to promote feminism. It 
permits girls from religiously conservative families to attend 
public school with children from many other backgrounds. A 
school has the opportunity to teach a girl who wears a headscarf 
about principles of sex equality and to practice those principles 
as well. Girls lose contact with other children and teachers who 
believe girls are equal to boys if they are kept at home to take 
correspondence classes or sent to Muslim schools.84 Bans have 
caused some girls to end their education prematurely.85 Some 
evidence suggests that French girls who are forced to remove 
their headscarves subsequently drop out of school at sixteen 
when attendance is no longer required.86 Without a high school 
education, such girls are doomed to menial work, depriving them 
of the material means to shrug off subordinating cultural beliefs 
and don the mantle of equality. 
 
 83. See School Ban on Scarves Wins Praise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/15/world/europe/15iht-paris.html (reporting that Le 
Monde had published a report by the “Freedom Committee, a Muslim group supporting 
schoolgirls who defied the law,” and explaining that that report said that “47 [girls] had 
been expelled from school and 533 had agreed under pressure to shed their head 
scarves”). 
 84. Similarly, France’s denial of citizenship to women who subscribe to traditional 
Muslim norms of conduct and dress make these women more vulnerable to exploitation 
by their husbands and male relatives, as Kerry Abrams describes in her chapter. Such a 
woman cannot leave her husband without losing her right to live in France, which may 
mean that not only must she return to her home country but she may also lose her 
children, who may have French citizenship.  
 85. France mandates school attendance until 16, Florence Lefresne, Contribution to 
EIRO thematic feature on Youth and work - case of France, EIRONLINE, (May 3, 2007), 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/12/tfeature/fr0512101t.htm, so parents cannot 
withdraw girls from French public schools without their receiving some alternative form 
of education, either in a private school or through correspondence courses. 
 86. Kimberly Conniff Taber, Isolation Awaits French Girls in Headscarves, 
WOMEN’S E-NEWS (Mar. 5, 2004), http://oldsite.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/ 
1738/context/archive (reporting that an “investigation by Le Monde newspaper in 
February [2004] showed that it was rare for the girls who left public school because of the 
headscarf to continue any sort of schooling beyond age 16, when it is no longer 
required”). It proved frustratingly difficult to determine from English language 
newspapers just how many girls have sought alternative education as a consequence of 
the ban on headscarves. French schools expelled about 47 girls—hundreds of other 
Muslim girls apparently complied with the ban. See School Ban on Scarves Wins Praise, 
supra note 83. That figure, however, does not reveal how many girls voluntarily opted for 
correspondence courses or private schools. There is some evidence that girls who opted 
for correspondence courses quit within 2 years. See Taber, supra. 
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In Germany, six states have banned public school teachers 
from wearing headscarves, and two other German states have 
banned civil servants as well as public school teachers from 
doing so.87 Berlin, for example, “categorically bars all public 
school teachers[,] . . . police officers, judges, court officials, 
prison guards, prosecutors, and civil servants working in the 
justice system, from wearing visible religious or ideological 
symbols or garments” except for “small pieces of jewelry.”88 
These policies have ended many women’s careers.89 
The European Court of Human Rights has upheld such 
bans as applied to students and teachers. One case upheld the 
firing of an experienced preschool teacher who had converted to 
Islam and started wearing a headscarf to school. “[T]he 
ordinance did not target the plaintiff’s religious beliefs,”90 the 
court held. It was designed, rather, to “protect others’ freedom 
and security of public order.”91 The children in the teacher’s 
classes—aged 4 to 8—were “easily influenced” by a “powerful 
external symbol,” the court reasoned. The teacher’s headscarf 
violated religious freedom of her pupils and their parents and 
the government’s policy of official religious neutrality.92 
Interestingly, most of the German states used reasons much 
like Case’s to justify their bans: wearing headscarves reflects 
beliefs that women were subordinate to men, which was 
inconsistent with the constitution of these states.93 (The French, 
in contrast, cited their religious neutrality principle of Laicite as 
the primary motivation for their headscarf ban.)94 Many of the 
German women who lost their jobs as a result of the ban 
disputed that the headscarf represented their subordination to 
men. One teacher implored: 
They should ask our colleagues, directors, school inspectors, 
the parents, the pupils what kind of persons we are. All of 
them . . . can attest for sure that I am not oppressed and that I 
 
 87. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DISCRIMINATION IN THE NAME OF NEUTRALITY: 
HEADSCARF BANS FOR TEACHERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN GERMANY 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/germany0209_webwcover.pdf.  
 88. Id. at 2.  
 89. Id. at 41.  
 90. Id. at 21 (citing Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1 (2001)). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 27–30 (explaining why various German states have adopted their 
bans).  
 94. Patrick Weil, Why the French Laïcité Is Liberal, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2699, 
2700–01 (2009).  
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do not wear the scarf because of oppression. . . . One cannot 
just simply assert this [that the headscarf indicates a woman’s 
oppression] like this.95 
Another protested: 
Many women with headscarves are not like this [i.e., 
oppressed or subordinate] and one cannot completely 
condemn a religion because of some being like this. . . . I am 
an example for integration . . . going out, striving for a job, 
finished my studies, did not marry young and only after 
completion of my university education. . . . I chose my 
husband freely, not under compulsion, I knew him long 
before, like it all should be. I was also not forced to wear the 
headscarf—I am practically a model of what they look for. 
They have now a promotional program for migrant women to 
study to become a teacher. Hello? Here I am, take me!96 
Many Muslim women complained the ban did not empower 
them; it lowered their social status. As one woman put it, “As 
long as we were cleaning in schools, nobody had a problem with 
the headscarf.”97 The ban made German citizens (even ones who 
were German-born converts) feel like outsiders. “One has the 
feeling ‘we don’t want you’ . . . . Where should I go? I belong 
here. . . . I would never have thought that would be possible.”98 
Equality and religious neutrality cannot completely explain 
Germany and France’s bans. Anxiety about and discomfort with 
increasing numbers of Muslim immigrants motivated these bans, 
too. That fact is most apparent in Germany—five of the eight 
states that ban religious clothing make an exception for 
Christian symbols and clothing.99 These symbols do not violate 
the religious neutrality of the state because they “are in line with 
and preserve values expressed in their state constitutions,”100 
which embody Christian values. Case could respond that 
feminist fundamentalism would prescribe a different result. A 
nun’s habit, for example, embodies the values of the Catholic 
Church, which is not an institution committed to the equal status 
 
 95. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 87, at 42.  
 96. Id. at 42–43 (alterations in original).  
 97. Human Rights Watch, Germany: Headscarf Bans Violate Rights: State 
Restrictions on Religious Dress for Teachers Targets Muslim Women (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/02/26/germany-headscarf-bans-violate-rights. 
 98. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 87, at 41 (alterations in original).  
 99. Id. at 25–26.  
 100. Id. at 27.  
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of women, as women are ineligible for positions of authority and 
leadership within the Church. 
Feminist fundamentalism as a principle for action has no 
necessary stopping point. Headscarves and burqas may be 
particularly visible markers of a world-view in which women are 
inferior to men, but they are not the only markers. Indeed, why 
single out headscarves? Amish people prescribe modest dress for 
women (though men wear distinctively old fashioned clothes, as 
well). Mennonites and Orthodox Jews instruct women to dress 
modestly and distinctively, while Mennonite and Orthodox men 
wear clothes that, if not fashionable, do not call attention to 
themselves to the same extent. Indeed, as Beverly Baines points 
out in a different chapter, “all major religions” and “not just 
Islam . . . proselytize and/or practice sexual hierarchy” (p. 95). 
Living in San Diego, I see every day women who have paid 
thousands of dollars for painful (and potentially life-threatening) 
surgery to enlarge and firm their breasts, smooth their faces, and 
slenderize their thighs. They wear skin-tight, low cut shirts and 
short skirts and dresses to spotlight the results.101 In Minnesota, I 
often saw young women wearing short skirts and high heels as 
they bar hopped on nights with temperatures in the ‘teens; their 
dates wore sensible shoes, slacks, and coats. French women 
teeter among uneven cobblestones in high-heeled shoes,102 which 
over time shorten their Achilles tendons, making flat shoes 
painful and making sports activities difficult.103 
This irony is not lost on French Muslim women and girls. 
One French schoolgirl insisted, “People say that it’s the women 
 
 101. “And what about the ‘degrading prison’ of plastic surgery?” Martha Nussbaum 
demanded in an online column in the New York Times. Martha Nussbaum, Veiled 
Threats?, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/ 
veiled-threats/. “Every time I undress in the locker room of my gym,” she writes, “I see 
women bearing the scars of liposuction, tummy tucks, breast implants. Isn’t much of this 
done in order to conform to a male norm of female beauty that casts women as sex 
objects?” Id.  
 102. I exaggerate. French women do not teeter—they expertly and gracefully 
negotiate the hazards of uneven cobblestones. Cf. Seeking protection in downturn, French 
workers strike nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/01/29/world/europe/29iht-29francestrikeFW.19774970.html (noting that during a 
transit strike, “Parisians coped with the temporary adversity in true French style. Women 
biked in high heels, and men biked in business suits and ties”). 
 103. January W. Payne, On Your Feet, WASH. POST (May 8, 2007), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/04/AR2007050401940.html (ill-health 
effects of high heels include “bunions, stress fractures, joint pain in the ball of the foot, 
Morton’s neuroma, ‘pump bumps’ (enlargement of the bony area on the back of heel), 
corns and calluses, hammertoe, toenail problems and tight heel cords (shortening or 
tightening the Achilles tendon)”).  
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who wear the veil that are submissive. . . but I think it is those 
women [who do not wear headscarves] who are submissive, 
because it is what men want, women half naked.”104 This girl cut 
off her hair when the ban went into force. Some Muslim women 
adopt the headscarf in order to avoid the oppressive male gaze. 
One French Muslim woman in her twenties said, 
I have accepted hijab so that I can be appreciated for my 
intellect and personality rather than my figure or fashion 
sense. When I face a classmate or colleague I can be confident 
that my body is not being scrutinized, [or that] my bra-strap 
or pantyline [is] visible. I have repudiated the perverted 
values of our society by choosing to assert myself only 
through my mind.105 
Another young Muslim woman pointed out how “ironic” it 
was “that the French allow people to be topless on the beach but 
not covered head to toe in class.”106 
The principle of feminist fundamentalism is not necessarily 
limited to clothing. Women who drop out of the workforce to 
care for their young children reinforce the stereotype that this 
task is uniquely women’s work, making women generally less 
desirable to employers.107 Women who choose to work as nurses, 
preschool teachers, and elementary school teachers solidify the 
stereotype that women, not men, are naturally caring. And why 
focus only on women? Certainly men who choose to work in 
highly sex-segregated industries such as technology, construction 
work, firefighting, mining, or truck and car repair also reinforce 
the stereotype that these jobs are men’s work. 
Furthermore, Case’s feminist fundamentalism denies 
women respect and agency to determine how highly they rank 
equality with men in comparison to other values. Women who 
 
 104. Elizabeth C Jones, Muslim Girls Unveil Their Fears, BBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 
2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/4352171.stm (alteration in or-
iginal).  
 105. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the 
Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743, 764 
(2006) (alteration omitted) (quoting woman featured in Mod. Religion, Women & Islam, 
Are You Ready to Meet the Woman Who Can Get by Without Her Looks, http://www. 
themodernreligion.com/index2.html (quotation now available at Women in Islam: Are 
you ready to meet the woman who can get by without her looks?, ISLAMIC BULLETIN 
(Dec. 2001), http://www.islamicbulletin.com/newsletters/issue_22/women.aspx)). Her point 
may not be just hyperbole. While of course anecdotal, a visiting colleague of mine who 
teaches at the Sorbonne told me that women Ph.D. candidates often dress provocatively 
for their oral exams and their dissertation defenses.  
 106. Id. at 766 (quoting a woman interviewed by the authors).  
 107. See Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003). 
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wear headscarves and burqas cannot be easily dismissed as 
having false consciousness. The actual young French women 
who refused to shed their headscarves at school make the claim 
of false consciousness difficult to defend. The girl who shaved 
her head said of the school officials, “They drove me crazy and 
tried to brainwash me so much that I got fed up and I did it - I 
shaved my hair off,” believing that it would free her from the 
intrusive male gaze.108 This act both isolated her and focused 
more attention on her, however. She said that with her head 
shaved, “I feel alone [now]; I feel like a monster. It’s like being 
naked on the street.”109 
Beverley Baines also addresses how the public sphere and 
the private sphere bleed into one another (p. 83). Many 
Muslims, she explains, believe that Sharia (Islamic law) should 
govern family law disputes, even in secular societies. Muslims in 
Ontario, including some women who identified themselves as 
feminists, urged the provincial government to recognize the legal 
validity of decisions made by Sharia family law arbitrators. 
Baines denies that these feminist Muslim activists suffered from 
false consciousness. 
In 2006, the Ontario legislature refused to recognize Sharia 
arbitration decisions under the Family Statute Law Amendment 
Act, which denies legal enforcement for the rulings of religious 
arbitrators, but does not outright ban these arbitrations (p. 85). 
The debate over Ontario’s recognition of these religious family 
arbitrations, Baines says, represents on one level the familiar 
clash between freedom of religion and women’s equality that 
Case describes in her chapter (p. 84). Most (non-Muslim) 
feminists had fought legal recognition for these religious 
arbitrations because “private bargaining in family law tends to 
yield inferior results for many women; and women may not be 
truly free in their choice to arbitrate” (p. 94). On another level, 
however, these values do not inevitably clash—Muslim feminists 
argued that “sex equality and religious freedom are equally 
compelling values” (p. 84). Their arguments in favor of state 
recognition of these arbitration panels, Baines explains, 
resemble those of “intersectional feminists, who refuse to choose 
between their race and/or sexuality and their feminism” (p. 84). 
 
 108. Elaine Sciolino, France Turns to Tough Policy on Students’ Religious Garb, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/22/international/europe/ 
22france.html?_r=1. 
 109. Id. 
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When religion and women’s equality conflict, many 
feminists would argue, as Case does, that the state should let 
women’s equality prevail. It would be discrimination to ratify a 
decision premised on the belief that men and women possess 
different legal entitlements. Muslim feminists disagree. The 
standard feminist position, they argue, infantilizes religious 
women and denies them agency to make their own decisions. 
Some Muslims honestly believe that people who secure secular 
divorces “place their spiritual and social lives in dire peril” (p. 
86).110 Muslim women are competent enough, they argue, to 
choose to be treated unequally in the present life (as measured 
by Western norms) to serve God and secure their place in the 
afterlife (p. 102). Their argument fell on deaf ears in Ontario, as 
the Premier and the legislature believed Canadian law and 
Sharia law fundamentally conflicted and could not coexist. The 
Muslim feminists’ argument simply made no sense in the context 
of the Canadian Constitution, which forbids religious 
accommodation when religion conflicts with sex equality (p. 
104). 
Baines argues that Ontario’s refusal denies Muslim women 
(and, presumably, men) citizenship—they cannot follow their 
religion and Canadian law. In her view, this denial is unnecessary 
because human dignity, not equality, lies at the heart of the 
Canadian Charter (p. 106). Citizens have overlapping 
commitments to God and to the state, and recognizing and 
adapting law to the “messiness of overlapping commitments” is 
“more consistent with protecting human dignity” (p. 106). 
Whether or not Baines is right about the essential values of the 
Canadian Constitution, Baines is right to point out the irony of 
denying women the agency to determine their priorities for 
themselves in the name of feminism. 
These two chapters by Case and Baines reveal a problem 
with using “citizenship” as a new frame to achieve parity for 
women: citizenship is too general a concept to resolve specific 
controversies.111 Case presents a view of citizenship in which the 
government is committed to the equal status of men and women 
above all other values; it must ensure that the actions of some 
individuals do not undermine other individuals’ equal status. 
 
 110. Quoting Syed Mumtaz Ali & Anab Whitehouse, The Reconstruction of the 
Constitution and the Case for Muslim Personal Law in Canada, 13 J. INST. MUSLIM 
MINORITY AFF. 156, 170 (1992). 
 111. GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND 115 (2008). 
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Baines, in contrast, believes that women’s equality is a worthy 
goal because it ensures that a state does not arbitrarily deny on 
the basis of sex the fundamental liberty of citizens to determine 
their own lives. That fundamental liberty of citizens includes the 
freedom of an individual to value her religion above the equal 
provision of some legal rights. Who is right? “Citizenship” 
provides no answer. 
This next Section will now to turn to discussing other 
problems with using citizenship as a frame to promote women’s 
substantive equality. 
III. EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATUS IS A WORTHY GOAL 
BUT AN UNLIKELY TOOL FOR ACHIEVING 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
The chapters by Case and Baines suggest that citizenship 
might be, as Professors McClain and Grossman put it, both too 
general a concept and “too contested” to transform the debate 
about women’s equality. This Section will describe some 
additional reasons why equal citizenship status may not be the 
best tool for achieving women’s substantive equality. First, 
gender stereotypes permeate citizenship, so a fight for equal 
citizenship status is simply a different battle than that for 
women’s equality. Unless we wring sex stereotypes out of 
citizenship, a quest for equal citizenship status will produce 
something different than equality. Given that women and 
womanly things historically have suffered from second-class 
status, full citizenship status for women may still leave women 
stuck in second-class. Neutering the concept of citizenship is no 
easy task, either. 
Second, citizenship defines a relationship between a person 
and a state. Consequently, citizenship rights come with attendant 
obligations, a fact that most of the essays of this volume 
overlook. Generally put, the more obligations that a citizen 
shoulders, the better her claim to demand positive rights from 
the state. In a country that obliges a citizen to do relatively little, 
shifting from the rhetoric of equality to that of citizenship is 
unlikely to change people’s attitudes about the positive 
entitlements the state should provide to its citizens. 
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A. CITIZENSHIP’S MEANING IS CONTESTED AND CONTEXTUAL 
 1. Citizenship is gendered 
Kathryn Abrams’s chapter on three modern women’s anti-
war movements (p. 131) reveals a stumbling block in the way of 
the drive for equal status as citizens: gender stereotypes pervade 
the concept of citizenship. Her essay cautions that the concept of 
citizenship alone cannot do much work for feminism. 
Abrams notes that all anti-war protesters face an uphill 
battle for credibility. War protesters always risk appearing 
cowardly or disloyal112 because patriotic feelings run at their 
highest when war imperils a nation (pp. 132–33). At such a time, 
a person’s “obligations to the government, rather than  . . . rights 
against it,” take center stage (pp. 132–33).113 Anti-war protesters 
can establish credibility by claiming that some special 
characteristic about their group gives them authority to protest. 
One winning strategy is for protesters to assert that they have 
made some “individual sacrifice” to support “the war effort” (p. 
133). Former soldiers have the greatest credibility as protesters, 
as they are turning against the cause that made them heroes (pp. 
133–34). 
Women anti-war protesters usually cannot assert authority 
as former solidiers because American law formally excludes 
them from combat (p. 134).114 Instead, women protesters 
traditionally have drawn on their relationships to men who have 
been injured or killed during the war. Women who have lost a 
son or husband to war, for example, can use their sacrifices as 
evidence that they had “resolute[ly] and patriotic[ally] 
 
 112. See, e.g., E.J. Montini, What Some Moms Did During Their Summer Vacation, ARIZ. 
REPUB., Aug. 16, 2005, at 10B (reporting that “There have been counterprotests [to Cindy 
Sheehan’s month-long vigil outside of President Bush’s Crawford Ranch]. Sheehan has 
been accused of being unpatriotic and even treasonous”). 
 113. Emphasis added. 
 114. Though American law still prohibits women from serving in combat, Lizette 
Alvarez, G.I. Jane Stealthily Breaks the Combat Barrier, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, at 
A1, the United States military has creatively worked around these formal restrictions. Id. 
The nonconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, moreover, have blurred the line 
between combat and non-combat positions. Id. (“[T]he Afghanistan and Iraq wars, often 
fought in marketplaces and alleyways,” have given women the opportunity to “prove[] 
their mettle in combat” as the “number of high-ranking women and women who com-
mand all-male units has climbed considerably along with their status in the military.”). 
Women have flown combat aircraft and served on combat ships since the 1990s when 
Congress lifted that gender ban. Michele Norris, Roles for Women in U.S. Army Expand, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=14869648. 
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surrender[ed] . . . their family members to military service” (p. 
133). Women’s protests, in other words, often rely on derivative 
authority dependent on the protesters’ relationships with men. 
The reliance on these roles often calls to mind stereotypes about 
wives and mothers, and these stereotypes often color women’s 
credibility as protesters. Sometimes these stereotypes strengthen 
women’s protests, and sometimes they weaken them. 
Abrams describes three women’s antiwar movements that 
have played on their womanhood to claim unique authority to 
“expose the error of war” (p. 134). Those three are Cindy 
Sheehan’s month-long vigil outside of George W. Bush’s ranch 
in Crawford, Texas, in protest of the Iraq war, Code Pink’s 
protest of both the war in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and the 
weekly protests by Israeli Women in Black of the continuing 
Palestinian conflict. 
Cindy Sheehan’s vigil illustrates all of Abrams’s main 
points. In 2004, Sheehan’s son, Casey, was killed in the Iraq war. 
President Bush met with her later that year at the White House. 
This meeting infuriated her. According to Sheehan, President 
Bush “wouldn’t look at . . . pictures” of Casey,115 and “[h]e didn’t 
even know Casey’s name.”116 After her meeting with Bush, 
Sheehan felt deeply insulted as a mother and on behalf of her 
son. She used President Bush’s slights to her and her son to 
legitimate her protest later that summer. When President Bush 
vacationed at his home in Crawford, Texas, in August of 2004, 
Sheehan camped outside its gates. She refused to leave until he 
met with her again. She demanded that he explain to her, “Why 
did [you] kill my son?”117 “[The President] said my son died in a 
noble cause, and I want to ask him what that noble cause is.”118 
Was it so noble that “he [had] encouraged his daughters to 
enlist” to fight for it?119 She also wanted to “ask[] him to quit 
using Casey’s sacrifice to justify continued killing” in Iraq.120 He 
should instead “use Casey’s sacrifice to promote peace.”121 
 
 115. Helen Thomas, Reality of War Spoils Bush’s Vacation, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 19, 2005, at B6. 
 116. Interview by Wolf Blitzer with Cindy Sheehan (Aug. 7, 2005), available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/07/le.01.html. 
 117. Editorial, Smearing the Mom of a Soldier: How the Right Attacks Even the 
Grieving, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 11, 2005, at 15.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Montini, supra note 112, at 10B. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
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Sheehan’s motherhood gave her real credibility. It gave her 
the prerogative to demand President Bush’s (and the nation’s) 
attention: her young son—her flesh and blood—had died in Iraq. 
She had “skin in the game,” (p. 137) which the President did not. 
She had special knowledge about the real costs of the Iraq war 
that the President and his advisors lacked because they had not 
risked their children’s lives. 
Sheehan also used her motherhood to establish her 
credibility as a protester by camping out in a ditch in the Texas 
heat of August. The physical discomfort she endured recalled 
other sacrifices of physical comfort and physical appearance that 
mothers routinely make (pp. 144–45). (These uncomfortable 
conditions also reminded onlookers of the physical discomfort 
suffered by soldiers (p. 144).) Finally, her camping outside of 
President Bush’s ranch effectively staked a claim to that land (p. 
144). By refusing to leave, she defended her right to hold it. 
Historically women have neither staked nor defended claims to 
land. Her “occupation” also symbolized the American troops’ 
occupation of Iraq. Her occupation of that land grabbed the 
media’s (and America’s) attention (p. 144). 
But Ms. Sheehan’s motherhood and womanhood planted 
some significant landmines in her path, as well (pp. 143–44). Her 
plain speaking manner and frequent cursing made her look 
coarse, angry, and intimidating (pp. 143–44). Sheehan’s husband 
filed for divorce during her protest, making her look like a 
neglectful wife (p. 147). Worse yet, Sheehan had also left her 
other children behind at home, making her look like a bad 
mother (p. 147). She was criticized for neglecting these womanly 
duties for a political cause (p. 147). 
Sheehan’s use of her motherhood and the criticisms she 
received because of her roles as wife and mother call to mind the 
separate spheres ideology of the nineteenth century. That 
ideology placed tremendous roadblocks in the way of women’s 
gaining the right to vote. Women have always been citizens of 
the United States, but women could only exercise their 
citizenship derivatively as daughters, wives, or mothers for the 
first 130 years of America’s history. The law forbade them to 
vote because their husbands and fathers had the prerogative to 
represent their interests. When the Fifteenth Amendment 
granted black men the right to vote, Congress relied on this male 
prerogative to deny women the vote. Before they could receive 
the right to vote, women would have to overthrow “laws and 
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customs that restricted women’s roles in marriage and the 
market,” according to Reva Siegel.122 
Opponents of women’s suffrage feared that giving women 
the vote would “attack[] the integrity of the family” as wives 
overthrew their husbands’ authority to represent them in the 
public sphere.123 Women might even oppose their husband’s 
political views (perish the thought!). Women who asserted a role 
in politics, opponents argued, “denie[d] and repudiate[d] the 
obligations of motherhood.”124 Allowing women to vote 
“would . . . utterly destroy[]” “the family”125 
These claims sound comically cataclysmic and far-fetched 
today. But the criticisms that Cindy Sheehan received echo this 
rhetoric. When her protest conformed to traditional gender roles 
these stereotypes helped her cause, as her motherhood gave her 
credibility and authority to protest the war. But when her 
devotion to her cause led her to neglect her traditional roles as a 
woman and mother, she was criticized for her neglect, and her 
protest suffered. Sex roles, in short, still affect women’s roles as 
citizens. 
The persistence of these gender stereotypes implies that the 
fight for equal citizenship status for women cannot make a 
simple end run around the pitfalls of the women’s equality 
movement. Unless citizenship is neutered, women’s “citizenship 
status” will reflect stereotypes (or put less negatively, 
generalizations) about women. Whether these stereotypes 
reduce or increase women’s status is hard to say, but that these 
stereotypes will affect it is not hard to figure. A fight for equal 
citizenship status will therefore produce different results than a 
fight for sex equality, which in the United States has focused on 
erasing sex stereotyping. 
If sex stereotypes are the only barrier to the usefulness of 
women’s equal citizenship status, then citizenship status is no 
worse than equality, which is also dogged by sex stereotypes. 
Certainly, sex stereotyping in the United States has lessened 
dramatically since the turn of the twentieth century. The argu-
ments against women’s right to vote provoke laughter. In thirty 
years, our current views of womanhood and motherhood may 
seem silly, too. 
 
 122. Siegel, She the People, supra note 40, at 1035. 
 123. Id. at 978. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
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There is, however, an additional problem with the concept 
of citizenship that does not affect the concept of equality. 
Sheehan’s story and the arguments about women’s suffrage show 
that the concept of citizenship is closely related to the concept of 
family. As I will now explain, this close relationship makes 
draining gender typing from citizenship difficult. I will argue that 
citizenship will continue to reflect sex stereotypes so long as sex 
stereotyping still pervades our concept of family. It does not 
mean that citizenship can never be sex neutral, but it does 
suggest that the rhetoric of citizenship cannot undo mischief 
caused by sex stereotyping. 
 2. Citizens are part of a national family, so as family roles 
are gendered citizenship is, too 
What does citizenship have to do with families? George 
Lakoff, a professor of linguistics at Berkeley, has studied how 
our minds process language and understand our experiences and 
the world around us. He argues that our early experiences as 
children map certain metaphorical frames into our brain 
circuitry.126 Those metaphorical frames profoundly influence how 
we later perceive and describe people and things around us. Two 
of the earliest pleasures we encounter as babies, for example, are 
our parents’ warm bodies and warm milk. Lakoff says it is no 
accident that we later speak of emotional states in terms of 
temperature.127 “She is a warm person” means “she is affectionate.” 
“He warmed to her” means “his affection for her grew.”128 
The concepts of government and governance grow out of 
our family relationships, too, as these relationships are our first 
experiences with both. Parents govern their children, telling 
them what to do and what is good and bad for them and for the 
family. Parents expect things from children—children will speak 
to them respectfully, help with chores, eat what’s served for 
dinner, use decent table manners, do their homework, etcetera. 
Parents use carrots and sticks to enforce their expectations and 
directives—expressing delight and paying attention to a child’s 
good behavior, and expressing disapproval, ignoring children, 
and withholding rewards and privileges when they do something 
parents do not want. 
 
 126. LAKOFF, supra note 111, at 83–85. 
 127. Id. at 84.  
 128. “Affection is warmth” is not reciprocal. No one says, “The water got more 
affectionate,” because we encounter temperature in many contexts that have nothing to 
do with physical contact. Id.  
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According to Lakoff, governments share the elemental 
structure of other institutions. Governments are “structured, 
publicly recognized social group[s] that persist[] over time. 
‘Governing’ is setting expectations and giving directives, and 
making sure that they are carried out by positive or negative 
means.”129 
Families are the first institution to which we belong. 
Discipline from our parents is our first experience with 
governance. As a consequence, our concepts of “governance and 
family life co-occur;” they bleed into each other.130 According to 
Lakoff, “[t]his co-occurance gives rise to an extremely important 
primary metaphor: a Governing Institution is a Family.”131 This 
metaphor appears whenever we talk of institutions—people, for 
example, often speak of companies as families or their co-
workers as being just like family. 
When this metaphor applies to the government, the 
metaphor of family has a few basic variations, Lakoff explains. 
Two relate to our discussion of citizenship. 
First: 
The Institution [the Nation] is the Family 
The Governing Individual [the Government] is a Parent 
Those Governed [the Citizens] are Family Members132 
Second: 
The Institution [the Nation] is Family 
The Governing Individual [the President] is a Parent 
Those Governed [the Citizens] are Family Members133 
This metaphor of government as “government as family” 
and “citizens as members of a family,” are what Lakoff calls 
primary metaphors.134 Primary metaphors have “a much stronger 
basis in experience than other models,” or metaphors, and “our 
brains form that mapping more readily and much more 
 
 129. Id. at 85.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 86.  
 133. Id. Lakoff cautions that the fact that, in the metaphor of the government as 
family, “citizens are family members” does not mean that “citizens [are] dependent 
children.” Instead, citizens are just “family members with no further specifications.” Id. 
at 86, 88.  
 134. Id. 
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strongly.”135 This deep mapping means that primary metaphors 
cannot be changed readily. 
The consequence of these metaphors is that we understand 
“citizenship” through the metaphor of family. Families have 
gender roles, and, as the previous discussion of Abrams’s 
chapter and the women’s suffrage movement show, the primary 
metaphor of “citizens as family” is gendered, too. Our language 
and our understanding of history reflect that fact: George 
Washington is the father of our country; John Adams, Thomas 
Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Benjamin 
Franklin were among our “founding fathers.”136 The Civil War 
pitted brother against brother. Platoons of soldiers are “bands of 
brothers.” The cabinet department in charge of domestic 
security (there domestic reflects family) is the “Department of 
Homeland Security.”137 Thus, someone who thinks the family 
model wrongly invokes gender roles cannot just propose a new 
metaphor (such as nation as community or nation as team) and 
expect that new metaphor to stick.138 
The idea that we understand the concept of country and 
citizen through our concepts of family and family members helps 
to explain why anti-suffragists thought that the vote posed a fatal 
threat to the family as an institution. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, citizenship, civil rights, and stereotypes 
prescribed specific and distinct roles for men and women within 
families.139 
To the husband, by natural allotment . . ., fall the duties which 
protect and provide for the household, and to the wife the 
more quiet and secluded but no less exalted duties of mother 
to their children and mistress of the domicile.140 
Women were citizens, but in the eyes of the anti-suffragists 
women “did not need the vote because they were already 
represented in the government by male heads of household.”141 
Their husbands or fathers had the duty to exercise women’s civil 
 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 76, 87.  
 137. Id. at 76. 
 138. Id. at 88. 
 139. Siegel, She the People, supra note 40, at 979 (documenting how gender roles 
pervaded these ideas).  
 140. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting from an 1883 report from the House 
Judiciary Committee rejecting a constitutional amendment that would grant women the 
right to vote).  
 141. Id. at 981. 
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and political rights for them. The right to vote would “introduce 
domestic discord into the marital relation and distract women 
from their primary duties as wives and mothers.142 “American 
traditions of individualism, ‘self-government,’ and ‘self-
representation’” would invade the home and unseat the husband 
and father’s authority to represent his wife or daughter.143 
To refute the argument that the right to vote would destroy 
the family, suffragists first had to change law and norms 
governing family and marriage. Professor Siegel explains that 
the effort to overthrow “the common law of marital status” went 
hand in hand with the suffrage fight.144 They “sprang from a 
common vision.”145 Suffragists’ “vision of family life” in which 
women were individual legal agents just the same as their 
husbands conflicted absolutely with the common law.146 They 
labored for decades to change the laws and norms surrounding 
families. They attacked marriage and property law, which 
deprived women of individual agency. They indicted “male 
privilege in the family and elsewhere,” denouncing women’s 
“physical coercion in marriage,” such as “domestic violence, 
marital rape, and ‘forced motherhood.’”147 Suffragists also 
attacked and finally overthrew the legal structures that made 
women dependent on their husbands, such as “property rules 
that vested in the husband a right to his wife’s earnings and to 
the value of his wife’s household labor.”148 
Lakoff’s notion that “government as family” and “citizens 
as family” are primary metaphors explains why suffragists had to 
change the laws and norms governing family and marriage 
before they gained the right to vote. The argument that women’s 
equal citizenship status depended on their having the right to 
vote made no sense when husbands and fathers were duty bound 
to represent their interests. The nineteenth-century concept of 
women’s citizenship as derivative of their husband’s or father’s, 
indeed, denied women the individual right to vote. Only once 
women had independent agency within families—women could 
own their own property, make their own money, contract for 
 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 993. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 992.  
 148. Id.  
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themselves, and possess their own bodies—did it seem unjust to 
deprive women citizens of the right to vote. 
The suffrage movement fought for—and created—a new 
vision of “family that contemplated a far more prominent role 
for women in the nation’s economic and political institutions.”149 
Once suffragists changed the institutions of family and marriage 
then, they could argue that giving women the right to vote would 
strengthen families. Women citizens could participate in new 
forms of “social housekeeping”—helping to make “decisions 
about new ways government might provide for the health and 
welfare of families living in America’s growing cities.”150 In short, 
suffragists gained the right for women citizens to vote by 
changing the role of women citizens to include the individual 
right to voting; to do that they had to change gender norms in 
families. 
The suffragists did not try to erase all gendered ideas about 
citizenship or the family; nor is it likely that they could have. 
“Our minds already possess frames,” Lakoff writes. Successful 
policies and political arguments must therefore “fit within 
them.”151 Changes in marriage law and criminal law gave 
husbands and wives more equal rights, which changed gender 
norms, but did not erase them. As with family, so goes 
citizenship. The “social housekeeping” argument, for example, 
shows that even after women got the vote, a woman’s role as a 
citizen was still distinct from a man’s. As Professor Abrams’ 
chapter demonstrated, gender still shapes the concept of 
citizenship. 
A successful strategy for women’s equal status as citizens 
cannot simply define citizenship as containing certain attributes 
and demonstrate that certain privileges and rights follow from 
that definition. If the “frame” of citizenship does not already 
contain those attributes, then, as the suffragist movement shows, 
the frame or the attributes embedded within it must change first. 
The fact that our concept of citizenship remains gendered 
reflects the fact that families and familial roles remain gendered 
(though certainly gender shapes family and family roles far less 
than it did ninety years ago).152 
 
 149. Id. at 993.  
 150. Id.  
 151. LAKOFF, supra note 111, at 68. 
 152. This concept of frames is a bit circular. The idea that arguments for change 
must fit within frames could imply that change is well nigh impossible. For example, the 
legal changes to women’s rights to own property or to make contracts without their 
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The main argument running through most of this volume’s 
chapters, thus, relies on a bootstrap. That argument is that “full 
citizenship status” requires a change in policies that have 
contributed to constructing and support sex inequality (such as 
limited and unpaid maternity and paternity leave, and gendered 
patterns of childcare). This argument is a bootstrap because 
citizenship roles reflect family roles, not the other way around. 
These gendered family roles cannot be changed by objecting that 
they deny women full status as citizens, because citizenship and 
citizenship status are defined in reference to these roles. 
Citizenship, in the end, brings us right back to where we 
started: to the problem of sex equality. Sex still affects how we 
divide work within and outside of the home. Sex stereotypes 
drive this division of labor. Martha Fineman’s chapter 
acknowledges as much. She describes how our American 
concept of family undergirds sex inequality. The American 
“prelegal notion of the family” inevitably subordinates women 
(p. 256). People in the United States, she says, generally believe 
that families are independent institutions, wholly distinct and 
separate from the state. Women’s “unique reproductive roles 
and responsibilities . . . define them as essentially different and 
necessarily subordinate in a world that values economic success 
and discounts domestic labor” (p. 256). The idea that family is a 
prelegal, private institution is just wrong, Fineman contends. It is 
built on an even deeper lie—that individuals are autonomous. 
Human life is fragile, she explains. Each of us has been wholly 
dependent on others for our survival. Each of us is vulnerable to 
becoming so again (pp. 258–59). Recognizing essential human 
vulnerability reveals that achieving substantive equality 
 
husbands’ consent are inconsistent with the nineteenth century frame of family, in which 
the male head of household legally represents and subsumes the legal identities of his 
dependents. Change does occur and has occurred, however. Lakoff suggests that change 
occurs slowly and incrementally so that we gradually adjust frames rather than 
overthrowing them in one fell swoop. So, for example, some husbands abandoned their 
families, leaving behind a technically married woman who could not own her own prop-
erty or make contracts on her own behalf. This practical problem required legal change. 
Another explanation may also be possible. Women could invoke other frames with which 
their inability to own property and make contracts was inconsistent. When women began 
working for wages, for example, their employment was inconsistent with the traditional 
role of wife. It may have cued other frames, such as “employee” and “slave.” Employees 
trade their own individual labor for wages paid to them individually. The nineteenth 
century exception to that rule was slavery, in which owners received wages earned by 
their slaves’ labor, and this frame increased in prominence as the Civil War approached. 
Clearly, it would not be acceptable to think of wives as their husband’s slaves. If women 
were employees, however, then they earned their own wages, and this “counter-frame” 
required some adjustment in the frames of wife and family.  
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“require[s] state intervention, even . . . reallocation of some 
existing benefits and burdens” (p. 259). She is skeptical that we 
have wrung all progress from the concept of equality, and 
believes that most arguments for changes in family policy will 
have to depend on equality. 
In sum, stereotyped family roles must change before 
stereotypes about citizenship roles will change, given that 
citizenship roles reflect family roles, and not the other way 
around. Until gender exerts less influence on family roles, 
Lakoff’s theory predicts that a majority of Americans will not 
perceive that women’s continued (though significantly lessened) 
economic dependence on men brands them as second-class 
citizens, or that their disproportionate exclusion from positions 
of corporate and political power does either. 
As I write this review, however, the gendered concept of 
family is undergoing profound changes. Same sex marriage is 
one of the forces driving that change.153 New York, one of the 
most populous states in the nation, has recently granted same 
sex partners the right to marry.154 Some fear that same sex 
marriage threatens the family. They are partly right and 
profoundly wrong. They are partly right: as same sex marriage 
becomes acceptable, legal families will no longer be constructed 
along traditional sex roles. In same sex marriages, women head 
families and men care for small children. These changes will 
amplify changes that have been occurring for a while. Sex and 
gender have shaped the concept of family for a long time (and 
vice versa), and gendered families have been one very important 
cornerstone of American life. 
The idea that same sex marriage threatens the family is 
profoundly wrong. Tens of thousands of same sex families show 
that individuals do not need to follow traditional gender scripts 
to commit to each other for life, and children can successfully be 
reared in families without these scripts, too.155 A belief in the 
 
 153. Of course, gender roles within marriage have been eroding for decades. See 
generally Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Is Anyone Doing the Housework?: Trends in the 
Gender Division of Household Labor, 79 SOC. FORCES 191, 191 (2000) (documenting 
how women did half as many hours of housework in the 1990s than they did in the 1960s 
while men’s hours doubled over the same period).  
 154.  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (1) (McKinney 2011) (“A marriage that is other-
wise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same 
or different sex.”). 
 155. Rachel H. Farr et al., Parenting and Child Development in Adoptive Families: 
Does Parental Sexual Orientation Matter?, 14(3) APPLIED DEV’L. SCI. 164, 166 (2010) 
(summarizing research that has shown that the sexual orientation of parents is not linked 
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equality of committed same-sex couples and different-sex 
couples simply belies the belief that sex roles are essential to 
family. The institution of family will persist after same sex 
marriage becomes routine, just as it did after women started 
voting. 
That gender roles in marriage and family are eroding does 
not necessarily mean, however, that in two decades Americans 
will have paid parental leave, sex quotas in national office, or 
federal laws that criminalize domestic abuse or date rape. A 
further problem lurks about the use of citizenship to insist on 
policies and programs to improve the substantive equality of 
women. The concept of “full citizenship status” does not itself 
specify the rights required to have full citizenship status. Instead, 
as this next section will explain, the rights required for a person 
to have “full citizenship status” vary from country to country. 
 3. Citizenship rights depend on citizens’ obligations, and 
different nations hold their citizens to different 
obligations 
As this review described earlier, T.H. Marshall, and other 
citizenship theorists who followed him, have divided citizenship 
rights into three classifications: civil rights (e.g., to sue, contract, 
and own property), political rights (e.g., to vote and hold office), 
and social or economic rights (e.g., sufficient economic security 
to exercise civil and political rights). Marshall theorized that 
citizenship required rights from each. 
The introduction to Gender Equality leans heavily on 
Marshall in describing how citizenship might provide a means 
for achieving greater substantive equality for women. 
(Marshall’s theory of citizenship does continue to be the most 
influential.)156 It argues that women’s full citizenship status 
requires countries to ensure women’s social rights, which means 
that states must grant its people certain positive rights. These 
rights may include long, paid parental leaves, quotas to ensure a 
proportionate number of women hold national political office, 
enhanced state protection for women from private violence, and 
the right to abortion. Without such rights, women will, for 
example, shoulder more housework and childcare, which will 
 
with “child . . . outcomes,” but rather that “family processes, such as parenting quality 
and attachment” better predict “child outcomes”). 
 156. See THOMAS JANOSKI, CITIZENSHIP & CIVIL SOCIETY 6–7 (1998) (describing 
Marshall’s influence on political theory).  
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prevent a disproportionate number of women from climbing the 
corporate ladder or serving in important positions of political 
power. Women will be rendered second-class citizens if a 
disproportionate number of women are housekeepers and men 
are national political and corporate leaders. 
 The introduction appears to portray Marshall as positing 
that countries necessarily have a duty to provide citizens with 
specific social rights. If that portrayal is right, then states must 
ensure certain positive rights to prevent women from being 
second-class citizens. A very good argument can be indeed made 
that robust social rights are necessary to guarantee women’s full 
status as citizens. 
Gender-neutral, unpaid leave simply has not equalized 
women’s economic or social status in the United States because 
it has not equalized parenting responsibilities for infants and 
young children. More women than men take parental leave, and 
they take more of it, too.157 This fact creates a feedback loop of 
gendered patterns of work inside and outside the home. 
Women’s leaves permanently reduce their wages;158 lower wages 
mean woman take on far more than half of the work at home; 
these burdens on time and energy reduce women’s interest in 
full time work, which further reduces their wages; and so on. As 
American society values paid work more than unpaid work in 
the home, women who stay home with children do not have the 
social status of men and women who work. It hardly bears 
mentioning that the United States’ current scheme of unpaid 
leave hampers women from burnishing their resumes and 
making the connections a person needs to run for (much less 
win) political office. So stereotypes persist that men make more 
effective leaders. 
The right for parents to take significant paid leave from 
work would disrupt the feedback loop of gendered decisions that 
tend to push women out of the workforce or into part time work 
 
 157. McGowan, supra note 21, at 27. Many different reasons contribute to this 
tendency. Men who shoulder an equal or more than equal share of housework and 
childcare suffer from stereotype backlash from their coworkers, friends, and 
acquaintances. Id. at 39. Rarely do people ask expectant fathers whether they plan to 
return to work after their new child is born. Women routinely entertain this question. Id. 
at 25. Wives often make less money than their husbands, making their salary easier to 
forgo. Id. at 26–27. Women also tend to assess their salaries in light of how much they are 
paying in childcare, while men don’t.  
 158. Even a year off from work hurts a woman’s career; she will lose on average 11% 
of her previous wages. Three years’ leave to care for children reduces a woman’s wages 
by nearly 40%. Id. at 28 (citing Hewlett & Luce, supra note 21, at 46).  
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when they have children. Paid parental leave encourages more 
men to take more and longer leaves.159 The most successful of 
these policies require men to take some significant part of the 
leave or the family loses that leave time entirely.160 In general, 
“Countries that offer leave benefits for fathers for long enough 
and with high enough wage replacement have quickly seen” the 
rate of men taking parental leave increase. “[C]lose to 90 
percent of fathers are reported to take paid paternity leave in 
Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, The Netherlands, and 
Norway . . . .”161 Providing men and women with paid parental 
leaves of about nine months to a year also appears to reduce the 
“mommy penalty”—the reduction of women’s wages that often 
accompanies motherhood, especially when women take long 
breaks from work.162 Recall, too, that McDonagh found that 
 
 159. EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH MILKMAN, LEAVES THAT PAY: EMPLOYER AND 
WORKER EXPERIENCES WITH PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA 17 (2011) 
(California’s provision of “wage replacement during family leaves[] seems to be an 
effective incentive for men’s increased participation in caregiving, both for fathers who 
are bonding with new or newly adopted children and for those caring for seriously ill 
family members.”). With regard to paid leave for pregnancy or parenthood, only a few 
states—most notably California—require employers to reasonably accommodate the 
actual physical limits an individual woman’s pregnancy imposes on her. CAL. GOV. CODE 
§ 12945(b)(1) (West 2005). Two states, California and New Jersey, also provide some 
paid parental leave to new parents funded by the state unemployment insurance system. 
The state of Washington has passed a similar insurance program for parental leave, but 
budget cuts have delayed its implementation until 2012. Sylvia Hsieh, Delay in Paid 
Family Leave Act, LAW. WKLY. USA (May 21, 2009); Rachel La Corte, Some WA 
Programs Laws in Name Only, SEATTLE TIMES (May 30, 2010). California and New 
Jersey pay out fairly low benefits, however, and for a total of 6 weeks (though two 
parents who do not work for the same employer can each take leave, for a total of 12 
weeks of benefits). California’s scheme pays out 55% of a person’s weekly wages, up to a 
maximum benefit of $987 in 2011. APPELBAUM & MILKMAN, supra, at 1. New Jersey 
provides two-thirds of a person’s average weekly wage for six weeks, up to a maximum of 
$559 per week. State of N. J. Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev., Wage Requirements—
State Plan, http://lwd.state.nj.us/labor/fli/worker/state/FL_SP_wage_requirements.html 
(last visited Sep. 30, 2011). 
 160. APPELBAUM & MILKMAN, supra note 160, at 17 (discussing how Sweden’s 
introduction of “‘lose it or use it’ days, which are additional days of [paid] leave that are 
granted to the family if and only if they are taken by the father” dramatically increased 
the number of men taking parental leave and the amount of leave they took). 
Appelbaum and Milkman also report that men in California are taking longer leaves now 
that that state provides some wage replacement. Id. at 18–19. Since California began 
offering wage replacement, the proportion of bonding leave claims filed by men has 
increased steadily over the life of the program, from 17% of bonding claims in 2004–05 to 
26% of claims in 2009–10. Id. at 18 fig.3.  
 161. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILING ITS FAMILIES: LACK OF PAID LEAVE AND 
WORK-FAMILY SUPPORTS IN THE US 34–35 (2011). 
 162. Id. at 35 (citing studies showing that countries with no paid leaves have the 
highest wage penalty for motherhood but that countries with paid leaves under a year 
have lower motherhood wage penalties). 
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countries with robust social rights also elected more women to 
national political office. 
The introduction and this volume of essays emphasize 
Marshall’s discussion of citizenship rights to the near exclusion 
of his discussion of citizenship obligations. Rights and 
obligations cannot be separated, however. Marshall himself said, 
“If citizenship is invoked in defense of rights, the corresponding 
duties of citizenship cannot be ignored.”163 For Marshall, 
citizenship rights and citizenship obligations are a two-way 
street. The more obligations citizens shoulder, the greater the 
state’s obligation to provide rights to its citizen, and vice versa. 
States strike different balances between rights and obligations, 
and the balance a country strikes depend on its history and 
culture. A country’s failure to provide citizens with generous 
social rights does not necessarily mean that it denies its people 
full citizenship rights. Some states that oblige their citizens to do 
relatively little may define citizenship rights to include mostly 
negative rights rather than positive rights. 
Thomas Janoski, a political scientist, has studied different 
countries to find out how well actual governments fit with 
Marshall’s framework. After studying over a dozen different 
democracies, Janoski found a great deal of variance in social 
rights among democracies. Some provided robust social rights 
(such as paid parental leave, a minimum guaranteed income, 
free healthcare) and others did not. Social rights correlated 
positively with citizen obligations. The more citizens were 
obliged to do (such as high taxes and compulsory military 
service)164 the more robust their social citizenship rights.165 
Countries that imposed relatively heavy obligations on its 
citizens and provided them with lots of social rights, Janoski 
found, tended to have fairly equal wealth distribution as well. 
The United States imposes relatively few obligations on 
citizens compared with other countries that provide lots of social 
rights. Scandinavian countries, for example, require young men 
to serve for 8 to 15 months in the military.166 Individuals and 
couples in these countries pay much higher taxes, too. In 2010, 
the average tax wedge for a two-earner couple with two children 
 
 163. JANOSKI, supra note 156, at 53 (quoting T.H. Marshall).  
 164. Id. at 125. 
 165. Id. at 125–33.  
 166. Id. at 58 tbl.3.3. 
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was 34% in Denmark, 33% in Norway, and 38.5% in Sweden.167 
A comparable American family pays about 25% of its income in 
taxes.168 The average tax wedge for individuals was 38% in 
Denmark, 37% in Norway, 43% in Sweden, and 30% in the 
United States.169 As might be predicted from these tax rates, 
wealth is fairly equally distributed in Scandinavian countries.170  
It is not in the United States.171  
Marshall’s theory would imply (and Janowski confirms) that 
United States citizens have mostly negative social rights and few 
positive social rights.172 American citizens have no obligation to 
vote, and most do not. The military has drafted no one into 
service for almost 40 years. The military instead has entirely 
relied on a volunteer military, even though two long wars in the 
last 10 years have deployed well over a hundred thousand 
soldiers at a time. Unless a family member or friend has been 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq have barely touched daily civilian experience. Though we 
have spent trillions of dollars on these wars and amassed record 
budget deficits, President Bush left his 2001 tax cuts in place and 
tried to make them permanent.173 Democrats and Republicans 
continue to battle whether they will expire or be extended.174 
 
 167. The 2010 rates in Denmark and Sweden are much lower than they were in 2000. 
In 2000, a Danish two-earner couple with two children paid 39% of its income in taxes, 
while such a Swedish couple paid 46% of its income in taxes. OECD Statistical Extracts, 
Comparative tables, Two-earner married couple, one at 100% of average wages and the other at 
67%, 2 children, average tax wedge, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode= 
AWCOMP (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). 
 168. Id. 
 169. OECD Statistical Extracts, Comparative tables, Single person at 100% of 
average earnings, no child, average tax wedge, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? 
DataSetCode=AWCOMP (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). As was true for married couples, 
the 2010 tax wedge for individuals in Sweden and Denmark is much lower than it was in 
2000. In 2000, an individual in Denmark paid 44% of her income in taxes and 50% in 
Sweden. Id.  
 170. JANOSKI, supra note 156, at 136.   
 171. There are other important differences. Scandinavian countries tend to have a 
corporatist structure to their governments; that is, they formally include important social 
groups in governing. The United States, in contrast, is pluralistic: interest groups vie for 
political power, and no interest group is guaranteed a seat at the table. Id. at 109. 
 172. Id. at 106. 
 173. Bush Wants Tax Cuts Made Permanent, USA TODAY (Jun. 2, 2008), http://www. 
usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-06-02-bush-tax_N.htm (explaining that President 
Bush campaigned to make his tax cuts permanent, saying that allowing them to expire 
would be harmful to an already limp economy). 
 174. Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama Unveils Deficit Reduction Plan, ‘Buffett Rule’ Tax on 
Millionaires, HUFF. POST POL. (Sep. 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/ 
09/19/obama-deficit-plan-buffet-rule-taxes-medicare_n_969403.html.  
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The United States’ refusal to adopt robust social policies 
like generous paid parental leaves does not necessarily represent 
hostility in the United States to women’s full citizenship. The 
United States does not, for example, provide generous gender-
neutral social rights, like a guaranteed minimum income or 
universal health care while withholding programs and benefits to 
help women balance home and work responsibilities.175 The 
United States’ failure to provide generous, paid parental leave 
likely reflects America’s general pattern of providing thin social 
rights. This review essay cannot definitively answer why the 
United States provides its citizens with few positive rights 
compared with other countries.176 
 
 175. The United States’ treatment of injured war veterans provides a vivid example 
of its general ambivalence toward guaranteeing robust social rights. Injured veterans, as 
might be predicted, have many “social rights” when compared with the civilian 
population—paid health care and rehabilitation, generous payments for work disability, 
and educational benefits. Few are more venerated as citizens than those who have 
sacrificed their health on the battlefield. Year after year, however, Congress underfunds 
these programs and benefits. Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability 
Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2010) (“Veterans programs and 
commitments are chronically underfunded, administration is poor, and bureaucracies are 
inefficient.”); id. at 1125 (explaining that problems of chronic underfunding, poor 
administration, and poor integration of services “have been exacerbated by the current 
conflicts [in Afghanistan and Iraq], which were not adequately planned and budgeted for 
by the federal government”). At the height of the Iraq war, for example, wounded 
soldiers languished in Walter Reed Hospital. The hospital lacked adequate staff, 
supplies, and services. Id. at 1099 n.88. Wounded war veterans have sacrificed their 
health and bodily integrity for this country, and yet Congress does not feel obliged to 
fund these services fully. When the federal government’s failure to create a system for 
paid parental leave is considered along with the federal government’s treatment of war 
veterans, the United States looks more hostile toward guaranteeing positive social rights 
than hostile to women’s full status as citizens. 
 176. Janoski argues that a country’s balance between rights and obligations reflects 
the country’s origin and history. See JANOSKI, supra note 156, at 142–72. Scandinavian 
countries, for example, have been homogeneous societies for most of their histories. 
They may welcome immigrants, but the United States is a nation of immigrants. Norway 
and Denmark both were occupied during World War II, which solidified their 
populations against their occupiers. The United States prevailed in WWII, which 
strengthened our country’s might and economy and made the United States a very 
prosperous country in the 1950s. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark also have parliaments 
with proportional representation; we have a two-party, first past the post system. 
Working class parties have also formed political coalitions with either agrarian or liberal 
parties in Scandinavian countries, increasing the political power of lower income people; 
the working class, agrarians, and liberals often oppose each other in the United States. 
Compared to the United States, a much larger large proportion of Scandinavian 
countries’ population is over 65 and was throughout the twentieth century. Their 
embrace of robust social policies may reflect the fact that they have come to grips with 
humanity’s vulnerability and interdependence—something that Martha Fineman 
contends the United States tends to deny. Each of these factors, Janoski argues, 
contributes to the Scandinavian countries’ higher tolerance for taxation and compulsory 
military service and their preference for wealth equality and social services. 
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Given the United States’ longstanding ambivalence to 
positive rights, framing policies as necessary to ensure women’s 
full status as citizens probably will not help get these policies 
enacted. Americans seem not to understand positive rights as 
essential to individual citizenship. “Citizenship,” thus, cannot be 
expected to deliver more positive rights than “equality” has. 
In short, it is unrealistic to hope that much progress can be 
made on women’s rights by reframing the fight from a battle for 
equal protection of the laws to one for women’s equal status as 
citizens. Those who want greater substantive gender equality 
must persuade our fellow citizens to adopt policy changes that 
will change family and gender roles. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Occam’s razor suggests that if we want women and men to 
have equal social and economic status then we should argue that 
equality demands it. Equality has achieved enormous victories 
quickly. Forty years is an instant in the course of the history of 
human civilization, which has often relegated women into 
subservient roles. 
Lakoff’s theory about the relationship between our primary 
frames of family and our concept of citizenship fits with what we 
know about the barriers to women’s equal pay and equal status 
in the United States. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere,177 
two main phenomena account for most of the wage gap between 
women and men in America: occupational segregation178 and the 
unequal division of household labor and childcare.179 
 
 177. These two paragraphs draw heavily upon McGowan, supra note 21, at 42–43. 
 178. The proportion of women in an occupation explains between approximately 20 
to 30 percent of that wage gap. Stephanie Boraas & William M. Rodgers III, How Does 
Gender Play a Role in the Earnings Gap?: An Update, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 2003, 
at 9, 11. It is a linear relationship—the greater the proportion of women in an industry, 
the less they make. Id. at 13. Women working in predominately female occupations earn 
25.9% less than those in predominately male occupations. Id. at 14. Men working in 
predominately female occupations earn 12.5% less than those in predominately male 
occupations. Id. 
 179. American women with children take significantly more leave from work (for 
parenting and other reasons) than women without children and men with or without 
children. Women take leaves that average a little over two years, while men take about 
three months. Hewlett & Luce, supra note 21, at 46 (finding that women in their study 
took leaves averaging 2.2 years); see also Claudia Goldin, The Quiet Revolution That 
Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and Family, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006, 
at 1, 16 (finding that among 1976 women college graduates, leaves averaged 2.08 years). 
The more children a woman has, the longer she remains out of the workforce. Id. at 17 
(findings based on College and Beyond data that one child increased a woman’s time off 
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Norms that relate to men and women’s gender roles in the 
family contribute to both to the division of housework and 
childcare and to occupational segregation. First childcare: 
stereotypes that “children naturally have a special bond with 
[their] mothers . . . [and] men cannot nurture infants the way 
mothers can” strongly influence parents to divide paid work, 
housework, and childcare according to sex stereotypes.180 
Housework and childcare skew women’s job preferences before 
they ever become pregnant. Women anticipate their future work 
as mothers, and when considering what careers to pursue, 
women, not men, “routinely think about how motherhood can 
be combined with a particular career.”181  When men and women 
are later faced with the struggle to balance home and work life, 
women thus have fewer obstacles—both mental and actual—to 
cut back or adjust their work schedules.182 No surprise then that 
when men have children, their earnings increase,183 while 
women’s decrease.184  
Stereotypes about familial roles are so strong that women 
working outside the home pay for the perception that they are 
primarily responsible for the care of children, whether they are 
or not. A recent study found that “employed mothers in the 
United States suffer, on average, a 5 percent wage penalty per 
child even after controlling for other factors that affect wages.”185 
 
by about 4 months (.36 years), two by 17 months (1.41 years), and three by 34 months 
(2.84 years)). Forty-three percent of highly qualified women with children (defined as 
those who had a graduate, a professional, or a high-honors undergraduate degree) have 
voluntarily left work for six months or more. Hewlett & Luce, supra note 21, at 44. Only 
24% of highly qualified men have. Less than a sixth of those men who took time off did 
so to stay home with a child. Id. at 45. 
 180. Francine M. Deutsch, Equally Shared Parenting, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 25, 26 (2001). 
 181. FRANCINE M. DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: HOW EQUALLY SHARED 
PARENTING WORKS 149 (1999).  
 182. Id. 
 183. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Transitions: Career and Family Life Cycles 
of the Educational Elite, AM. ECON. REV., May 2008, at 363, 367.  
 184. Two years leave, the average for women, decreases a woman’s salary by 18% 
when she returns to work. Even a year’s leave hurts—returning salaries are 11% lower. 
Longer leaves hurt more: leaves of 3 years or longer reduce a woman’s wages by almost 
40%. Hewlett & Luce, supra note 21, at 46. Women who leave the job market during 
those years may find that their earnings never “catch up” to men’s. Id. at 46 (quoting 
Lester Thurow). Leaving work for over six months also makes it harder for women to 
return to full-time work. Only 74% of women who wanted to return to work could do so, 
and only 40% actually returned to full-time professional work. Id. Others took part-time 
jobs or became self-employed. Id. 
 185. Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic, 
60 J. SOC. ISSUES 683, 683 (2004) (citing Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage 
Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 204 (2004)).  
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Women labor “under pressure from ambient stereotypes saying 
that mothers can’t be serious professionals.”186 When profess-
sional women become mothers they trade the stereotype that 
they are competent but unlikable for the stereotype that they are 
warm but incompetent.187 (Proof that you can’t have everything.) 
People commonly believe that working mothers are less com-
petent than working fathers or childless women, but they 
perceive fathers as more competent than childless men.188 This 
perception of working fathers and mothers is predictable given 
our cultural belief that women should be the primary caregivers 
and men should be the breadwinners.189 
Occupational segregation and a gendered division of 
childcare and housework have persisted190 despite women’s 
significant gains in educational attainment, which now equals or 
exceeds men’s.191 They have also persisted despite women’s 
significant engagement in paid work and the prevalence of two-
earner families.192 
This gloomy state of affairs does not have to persist, and I 
predict it will not. In the last 40 years, the fight for women’s 
equality has changed gender roles and family roles 
tremendously. Pinching, patting, ogling and wolf whistling at 
women workers was just good fun in the 1970s, while today 
enough of it will violate federal law. Women now hold jobs in 
many occupations that men dominated in the 1960s and the 
1970s.193 Both men and women workers have the federal right to 
take equal amounts of parental leave. In the 1970s, women alone 
fought for voluntary maternity leave with a right to 
reinstatement and against mandatory maternity leaves that 
 
 186. Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t 
Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 701 (2004).  
 187. Id. at 703–04.  
 188. Id. at 709 tbl. 1.  
 189. Id. at 706.  
 190. See supra Parts II.A & II.B.  
 191. In 2000, 30% of young women (25 to 29) had a college degree or more, while 
28% of young men did. The Graduates: Educational Attainment, 2000, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, 9-2, http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/files/2000/chap09.pdf.  
 192. Seventy-eight percent of mothers were employed in 2000. SUZANNE BIANCHI 
ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 45 (2006). Among people 
who worked, 78% were part of a dual-earner family. Rosalind Chait Barrett, On Multiple 
Roles: Past, Present, and Future, in HANDBOOK OF WORK-FAMILY INTEGRATION 76 
(KAREN KORABIK ET AL., EDS. 2008). Looking at the data from a slightly different angle, 
in 2000, both spouses worked in about 54% of American marriages; among families with 
children under age 6, that figure increases slightly to about 58%. HARRIET B. PRESSER, 
WORKING IN A 24/7 ECONOMY 61 (2003) (citing 2000 Census data).  
 193. Occupational desegregation has stalled in the last 10 to 15 years.  
!!!MCGOWAN-281-STOPFIGHTFORWOMEN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2012 12:59 PM 
2012] BOOK REVIEWS 195 
 
forced them out of work during their pregnancies. All-male 
colleges and universities do not exist anymore; several Ivy 
League colleges, a few elite state universities, and military 
academies excluded women as recently as the mid 1970s.194 
Rogers Smith mused that men will have to be persuaded 
that women’s equality works for them (p. 33). As the arguments 
generally stand, achieving equality for women has generally 
meant extinguishing many of the privileges of manhood (p. 33). 
For some men, these privileges are part of the natural order of 
the world. For others, they are merely privileges, but privileges 
that they greatly enjoy and may be loathe to relinquish. Men 
have to be persuaded that they have something to gain from sex 
equality, too. Thus, I have titled this review “Stop Fighting for 
Women’s Equality.” A battle for sex and gender equality must 
be waged instead, and men may indeed have something to gain 
from this battle. But citizenship is not going to win it. 
 
 
 194. The military academies began admitting women in 1976 after Congress 
authorized women’s admission in 1975; Columbia College first admitted women in 1983, 
Dartmouth in 1972, Brown in 1971, Princeton and Yale in 1969. Harvard merged 
admissions with Radcliffe in 1977 and the two institutions formally merged in 1999.  
